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Abstract An incremental observer generation for modular systems is presented in
this paper. It is applied to verification and enforcement of current-state opacity and
current-state anonymity, both of which are security/privacy notions that have attracted
attention recently. The complexity due to synchronization of subsystems, but also
the exponential observer generation complexity, are tackled by local observer gen-
eration and an incremental abstraction. Observable events are hidden and abstracted
step by step when they become local after synchronization with other subsystems.
For systems with shared unobservable events, complete observers can not be gener-
ated before some local models are synchronized. At the same time, observable events
should be abstracted when they become local, to avoid state space explosion. There-
fore, a new combined incremental abstraction and observer generation is proposed.
This requires some precaution (detailed in the paper) to be able to accomplish local
abstractions before shared unobservable events are removed by observer generation.
Furthermore, it is shown how current state opacity and anonymity can be enforced by
a supervisor. This is achieved by a natural extension of the verification problem to a
supervisory control problem based on forbidden states and incremental abstraction.
Finally, a modular and scalable building security problem with arbitrary number of
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floors and elevators is presented, for which the efficiency of the incremental abstrac-
tion is demonstrated.
Keywords Modular transition systems, observer abstraction, current-state opacity,
verification, supervisory control.
1 Introduction
With the rapid growth of large communication networks and online services, and their
diverse applications, ranging from modern technologies in defense and e-banking to
health care and autonomous vehicles, security and privacy concerns on their infor-
mation flow are raised. This means that unauthorized people should not acquire the
information flow in these services, for instance in terms of being able to track and
identify real time location information about the users. There are various notions on
security and privacy for different applications based on their vulnerability to intrud-
ers. Next we provide some background information and related literature on topics
that are relevant to the developments in this paper.
Opacity verification One category of security notions, (Focardi and Gorrieri, 1996)
concerns the information flow from the system to the outside observer, which is called
opacity (Saboori and Hadjicostis, 2007; Jacob et al., 2016). Opacity is a general and
formal security property that has been widely investigated for discrete event systems
(DESs) for finite automata (Saboori and Hadjicostis, 2007; Bryans et al., 2008; Sa-
boori and Hadjicostis, 2008, 2014), but also for Petri nets (Bryans et al., 2005; Tong
et al., 2016, 2017a). A system is opaque if, for any secret behavior, there exists at
least one non-secret behavior that looks indistinguishable to the intruder (Saboori
and Hadjicostis, 2007; Lafortune et al., 2018). The security notion is investigated
for automata (Jacob et al., 2016) using either state-based predicates (Saboori and
Hadjicostis, 2007, 2011a; Jacob et al., 2016; Tong et al., 2017b), or language-based
predicates (Badouel et al., 2006; Saboori and Hadjicostis, 2008; Cassez, 2009; Lin,
2011; Tong et al., 2016).
Depending on the modeling formalism of the system and the secret, there are
different opacity notions, such as current-state opacity, initial-state opacity, and k-
step opacity (Jacob et al., 2016). Wu and Lafortune (2013) show that there exists a
polynomial-time transformation between different notions of opacity for finite au-
tomata and regular languages. Current-state opacity (Saboori and Hadjicostis, 2014;
Tong et al., 2017b) requires that the sequence of observable events seen by the in-
truder never allows the external observer to unambiguously determine that the current
state of the system falls within a given set of secret states. A number of examples and
applications are presented in Saboori and Hadjicostis (2011a). A privacy notion that
is adapted from current-state opacity is proposed in Bryans et al. (2008); Lin (2011).
It is called anonymity, and in Wu et al. (2014) it is used for location privacy and is
called current-state anonymity. The servers that access the user’s location information
are then regarded as intruders.
An intruder with partial observation can be modeled as an observer of the system,
meaning that it has full knowledge about the system structure, while it is only able to
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see the observable events of the system. Observers achieved by subset construction
(Cassandras and Lafortune, 2008) are deterministic finite automata that estimate the
set of possible current states for verifying properties of interest. There are several
works that exploit observer generation for opacity verification (Saboori and Hadji-
costis, 2011b, 2013; Wu and Lafortune, 2013; Wu and Lin, 2018).
Opacity enforcement Ensuring opacity on a system is usually performed by exploit-
ing supervisory control (Ramadge and Wonham, 1989) as in Takai and Oka (2008)
and Takai and Kumar (2009). Given a system that is not current-state opaque with
respect to a secret, it is required to design a maximally permissive supervisor that re-
stricts the behavior of the system to turn it into a current-state opaque system. The de-
sign of supervisors to enforce opacity is also sometimes called opacity enforcement.
In Badouel et al. (2006), the language-based opacity and a set of intruders having
different observations are considered. The work by Dubreil et al. (2008, 2010) is also
focused on language-based opacity enforcement for one intruder.
Enforcing opacity using supervisory control techniques is also investigated by
Saboori and Hadjicostis (2008). They propose methods for designing optimal su-
pervisors to enforce two different opacity properties, with the assumption that the
supervisor can observe all controllable events (Saboori and Hadjicostis, 2012). In the
work by Yin and Lafortune (2016); Tong et al. (2018), to enforce current-state opac-
ity, the assumption that all controllable events should be observable is relaxed. In Wu
and Lafortune (2014); Ji et al. (2018) a novel enforcement mechanism is proposed,
based on the use of insertion functions that change the output behavior of the system,
by inserting additional observable events.
Modularity and abstraction To verify or synthesize a supervisor to enforce current-
state opacity/anonymity in a modular system, it is required to generate the system’s
observer. Given the exponential complexity of observer generation, as well as the
complexity of interacting subsystems, especially for large complex modular systems,
state space explosion often occurs while performing verification or synthesis. For
this reason, reduction methods play an important role in making the procedure fea-
sible. Bourouis et al. (2017) use a binary decision diagram technique (Bryant, 1992)
to abstract graphs of moderate size, as a method for the verification of three differ-
ent opacity variants. Moreover, they prove that opacity properties are preserved by
composition, which guarantees that local verification of these properties can also be
performed.
In Zhang and Zamani (2017), a bisimulation-based method to verify the infinite-
step opacity of nondeterministic finite transition systems is proposed. Since this ab-
straction is based on strong bisimulation it has a minor reduction capability com-
pared to abstractions where local events are hidden, such as weak bisimulation (Mil-
ner, 1989) and branching bisimulation (Van Glabbeek and Weijland, 1996). Recently
the authors have proposed an abstraction method for current-state opacity verifica-
tion of modular systems (Noori-Hosseini et al., 2018) based on a similar abstraction,
called visible bisimulation equivalence (Lennartson and Noori-Hosseini, 2018). Both
state labels and transition labels (events) are then integrated in the same abstraction
method. This abstraction has the benefit that temporal logic properties are preserved
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in the abstraction, and the opacity verification in (Noori-Hosseini et al., 2018) is for-
mulated as a temporal logic safety problem.
Incremental observer abstraction In the abstraction, local events (only included in
one subsystem) are hidden and then abstracted such that temporal logic properties
related to specific state labels are still preserved. When subsystems are synchronized
more local events are obtained, which also means that more events can be hidden and
abstracted. This hiding/abstraction method is repeated until all subsystems have been
synchronized. The result is an incremental abstraction technique where state space
explosion is avoided when a reasonable number of events are local or at least only
shared with a restricted number of subsystems. Most real systems have this event
structure, and still some events can be shared by all subsystems. This incremental
abstraction technique for modular systems can be traced back to (Graf et al., 1996),
but its application to local events was more recently proposed in (Flordal and Ma-
lik, 2009), where it was called compositional verification. In (Noori-Hosseini et al.,
2018) this incremental abstraction is adapted to opacity verification, and it shows
great computational time improvement compared to standard methods.
Nonblocking transformation In this paper, both current state opacity verification and
current state anonymity verification are formulated based on state labels in transition
systems. Non-safe states in corresponding local observers are then naturally consid-
ered as forbidden states. By introducing simple detector automata, the problem is
easily transformed to a nonblocking problem. For this modular system, the efficient
conflict equivalence abstraction in Malik et al. (2004) and Flordal andMalik (2009) is
used, since it preserves the nonblocking properties of the original modular observer.
The reason for evaluating this abstraction is that it is known to be more efficient than
visible bisimulation. This abstraction has independently been proposed for opacity
verification by Mohajerani and Lafortune (2019) and Noori-Hosseini et al. (2019).
In both reports, the abstraction gives an enormous reduction in computation time,
compared to opacity verification without abstraction. In our work, the procedure is
evaluated on a scaleable building security problem, including an arbitrary number of
floors and elevators.
Observer abstraction including shared unobservable events Two main extensions
are also included in this paper, first the nontrivial introduction of shared unobserv-
able events. It means that complete local observers can not be computed before some
local models are synchronized. The reason is that shared unobservable events can not
be reduced in the observer generation before they have become local after synchro-
nization. At the same time, observable events should be abstracted when they become
local, to avoid state space explosion. The proposed solution is to extend the incremen-
tal abstraction with an incremental observer generation, such that a switch between
abstraction and observer generation can be performed when subsystems are synchro-
nized. This requires some precaution to be able to accomplish local abstractions be-
fore shared unobservable events are removed by the observer generation. Some minor
restrictions are included to be able to prove that the combined incremental observer
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generation and abstraction works correctly. This procedure includes additional tem-
porary state labels, which motivates the more general and flexible visible bisimulation
abstraction.
Incremental supervisor abstraction for opacity enforcement To enforce opacity and
anonymity it is also shown how an observer based maximally permissive super-
visor can be generated by incremental abstraction. This supervisor generation fol-
lows naturally as an extension of the original forbidden state formulation of opac-
ity and anonymity verification. The incremental abstraction is based on a supervi-
sion/synthesis equivalence proposed by Flordal et al. (2007);Mohajerani et al. (2014,
2017) as a natural extension of conflict equivalence (Malik et al., 2004).
Main contributions To summarize, the main contributions of this paper are: 1) a tran-
sition system based formulation of modular observers applied to current state opacity
and current state anonymity verification, 2) a simple transformation of the modular
observer verification problem to a nonblocking problem based on simple detector au-
tomata, a generic technique that can be applied to many verification and synthesis
problems, for instance abstraction based diagnosability verification (Noori-Hosseini
and Lennartson, 2019), 3) a combined incremental observer generation and abstrac-
tion for modular systems including shared unobservable events, 4) an incremental
abstraction based synthesis of observer based maximally permissive supervisors for
current state opacity and anonymity, 5) a modular formulation of a scaleable building
security problem including an arbitrary number of floors and elevators, and finally 6)
a demonstration on how efficient the proposed incremental abstraction of observers
for current state opacity and current state anonymity verification and synthesis works
for large modular systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After some preliminaries in-
troduced in Section 2, the problem statement is presented in Section 3. Efficient gen-
eration of modular observers is shown in Section 4, followed by some specific results
on current-state opacity/anonymity for modular systems in Section 5. In Section 6,
it is shown how a combined incremental observer generation and abstraction can
be achieved for systems including shared unobservable events. Section 7 presents a
scaleable floor/elevator building for which the efficiency of the proposed incremental
abstraction is demonstrated. In Section 8, an incremental abstraction based supervisor
generation for current state opacity and anonymity is developed, followed by some
concluding remarks in Section 9.
2 Preliminaries
A transition system G is defined by a 6-tuple G = 〈X,Σ, T, I, AP, λ〉 where X is
a set of states, Σ is a finite set of events, T ⊆ X × Σ × X is a transition relation,
where t = (x, a, x′) ∈ T includes the source state x, the event label a, and the target
state x′ of the transition t. A transition (x, a, x′) is also denoted x a→ x′. I ⊆ X is a
set of possible initial states, AP is a set of atomic propositions, and λ : X → 2AP is
a state labeling function.
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A subset L ⊆ Σ∗ is called a language. Moreover, for the event set Ω ⊆ Σ, the
natural projection P : Σ∗ → Ω∗ is inductively defined as P (ε) = ε, P (a) = a
if a ∈ Ω, P (a) = ε if a ∈ Σ \Ω, and P (sa) = P (s)P (a) for s ∈ Σ∗ and
a ∈ Σ. In the composition of subsystems, see Def. 2, events that are not included in
any synchronization with other subsystems are called local events. Such events are
central in the abstraction of observers.
Modeling ε transitions. The transition system G is now extended to include tran-
sitions labeled by the empty string ε. In this paper, the ε label will explicitly be
used for local unobservable events. If nothing special is pointed out, it means that
such local unobservable events are replaced by ε and therefore not included in the
alphabet Σ, while the total alphabet is extended to Σ ∪ {ε}. A sequence of ε tran-
sitions x = x0
ε
→ x1
ε
→ · · ·
ε
→ xn = x
′, n ≥ 0, is denoted x
ε
⇒ x′. A cor-
responding sequence, including possible ε transitions before, after and in between
events in a string s ∈ Σ∗, is denoted x
s
⇒ x′. The epsilon closure of a state x
is defined as Rε(x) = {x′ |x
ε
⇒ x′}, and for a set of states Y ⊆ X we write
Rε(Y ) =
⋃
x∈Y Rε(x).
A nondeterministic transition system generally includes a set of initial states,
ε labeled transitions, and/or alternative transitions with the same event label. A tran-
sition function for an event a ∈ Σ in a nondeterministic transition system is defined
as δ(Y, a) = Rε({x′ | (∃x ∈ Rε(Y )) x
a
→ x′ ∈ T }). An extended transition func-
tion is then inductively defined, for s ∈ Σ∗ and a ∈ Σ, as δ(I, sa) = δ(δ(I, s), a)
with the base case δ(I, ε) = Rε(I). Furthermore, the language for a nondeterministic
transition system is defined as L(G) = {s ∈ Σ∗|(∃x ∈ I) δ(x, s) 6= ∅}.
Local transitions and hidden τ events To obtain efficient abstractions, a special τ
event label is used for transitions with local observable events. The lack of commu-
nication with other subsystems means that the τ event is hidden from the rest of the
environment. The closure of τ -transitions in a finite path x = x0
τ
→ x1
τ
→ · · ·
τ
→
xn = x
′, n ≥ 0 is denoted x
τ
⇒ x′.
Note the difference between ε and τ events. Unobservable local events are re-
placed by ε before an observer is generated, which removes any ε transitions. Ob-
servable local events are then replaced by τ to model that they are hidden before
performing any abstraction. In process algebra, the replacement of any specific event
by the event τ is called hiding, cf. Milner (1989). A transition system G where the
events in Σh are hidden and replaced by τ is denotedGΣ
h
.
PartitionΠ and blockΠ(x) To obtain abstracted transition systems, states x, y ∈ X
that can be considered to be equivalent in some sense, denoted x ∼ y, are merged
into equivalence classes [x] = {y ∈ X |x ∼ y}, also called blocks. These blocks,
which are non-overlapping subsets of X , divide the state space into the quotient set
X/∼, also called a partition Π of X . The block/equivalence class including state x
is denoted Π(x) = [x]. A partition Π1 that is finer than a partition Π2, denoted
Π1  Π2, means that Π1(x) ⊆ Π2(x) for all x ∈ X . The partition Π2 is then said
to be coarser thanΠ1.
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Invisible, visible and stuttering transitions For a given state partitionΠ , a transition
x
τ
→ x′ is invisible ifΠ(x) = Π(x′), while a transition x a→ x′ is visible if a 6= τ or
Π(x) 6= Π(x′). A path x
τ
→ x1
τ
→ · · ·
τ
→ xn
a
→ x′ is called a stuttering transition,
denoted x։
a
x′, if Π(x) = Π(x1) = . . . = Π(xn), and a 6= τ or Π(xn) 6= Π(x′).
This means that the first n transitions are invisible, while the last one is visible. A
block stuttering transition corresponding to x։
a
x′ is denotedΠ(x)։
a
Π(x′).
Visible bisimulation Different types of bisimulations, used for abstraction, are either
defined for labeled transition systems, only including event labels (often called ac-
tions) on the transitions, or for Kripke structures, only including state labels (Baier
and Katoen, 2008). In this work, shared events are required for synchronization
of subsystems, while state labels are used to model security properties. Recently,
Lennartson and Noori-Hosseini (2018) introduced an abstraction for transition sys-
tems including both event and state labels, called visible bisimulation. It is directly
defined as an equivalence relation based on block stuttering transitions, and more
specifically on the set of event-target-blocks Γpi(x) = {։
a
Π(x′) |x ։
a
x′} that
defines all possible stuttering transitions from an arbitrary state x.
Definition 1 (Visible bisimulation equivalence)Given a transition systemG = 〈X,
Σ, T, I, AP, λ〉 and the state label partition Πλ(x) = {y ∈ X |λ(x) = λ(y)}, a
partitionΠ , for all x ∈ X determined by the greatest fixpoint of the fixpoint equation
Π(x) = {y ∈ X |Π  Πλ ∧ Γpi(x) = Γpi(y)},
is a visible bisimulation (VB) equivalence, and states x, y ∈ Π(x) are visibly bisimi-
lar, denoted x ∼ y. ✷
Quotient transition system Blocks are the states in abstracted transition systems, and
the notion partition Π is used in the computation of this model, while the result-
ing reduced model takes the equivalence perspective. It is therefore called quotient
transition system, and for a given partition Π it is defined as G/∼ = 〈X/∼, Σ, T∼,
I∼, AP, λ∼〉, where X/∼ = {[x] | [x] = Π(x)} is the set of block states (equiva-
lence classes), T∼ = {[x]
a
→ [x′ ] |x
a
→ x′([x′ ] 6= [x] ∨ a 6= τ)
)
} is the set of block
transitions, here specifically defined for VB, I∼ = {[x] | x ∈ I} is the set of initial
block states, and λ∼([x]) = λ(x) is the block state label function, where it is as-
sumed that λ(x) = λ(y), ∀y ∈ [x].
Visibly bisimilar states x ∼ y inG are also visibly bisimilar to the block state [x]
in G/∼, i.e. [x] ∼ x for all x ∈ X . Furthermore, G and G/∼ are VB equivalent,
denotedG ∼ G/∼. Combining hiding of a set of eventsΣh for a systemG, followed
by the generation of the quotient transition system, results in the abstracted transition
system GΣ
h
/∼
def
= GA
Σh
. This also means that GΣ
h
∼ GA
Σh
.
Synchronous composition The definition of the synchronous composition in Hoare
(1978) is adapted to τ events, where such events in different subsystems are not syn-
chronized, although they share the same event label. They are simply considered as
local events, which is natural since the hiding mechanism where an event is replaced
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by the invisible τ event is only applied to local events. This results in the following
definition of the synchronous composition, including τ event labels.
Definition 2 (Synchronous composition including τ events) Consider two transi-
tion systems Gi = 〈Xi, Σi, Ti, Ii, APi, λi〉, i = 1, 2. The synchronous composition
of G1 and G2 is defined as
G1 ‖G2 = 〈X1 ×X2, Σ1 ∪Σ2, T, I1 × I2, AP1 ∪ AP2, λ〉
where
(x1, x2)
a
→ (x′1, x
′
2) ∈ T : a ∈ (Σ1 ∩Σ2) \ {τ}, x1
a
→ x′1 ∈ T1, x2
a
→ x′2 ∈ T2,
(x1, x2)
a
→ (x′1, x2) ∈ T : a ∈ (Σ1 \Σ2) ∪ {τ}, x1
a
→ x′1 ∈ T1,
(x1, x2)
a
→ (x1, x
′
2) ∈ T : a ∈ (Σ2 \Σ1) ∪ {τ}, x2
a
→ x′2 ∈ T2,
and λ : X1 ×X2 → 2AP1∪AP2 . ✷
Any transitions with ε labels, representing local unobservable events, are handled
in the same way as τ event labels, representing observable local events, since both
stand for local events. On the other hand, before subsystems are synchronized, local
observers will in this work be generated. This means that any ε transitions will be
removed before synchronization.
Nonblocking and controllable supervisor In order to determine whether a system
satisfies a given specification or not, the system has to be verified, and if it fails, the
system is restricted by synthesizing a supervisor. This means that states from which
it is not possible to reach a desired marked state, called blocking states, are removed.
Furthermore, any uncontrollable events that can be executed by the plant are not al-
lowed to be disabled by the supervisor (Ramadge andWonham, 1989;Wonham et al.,
2017). Thus, a supervisor is synthesized to avoid blocking states and disabling uncon-
trollable events. Such a nonblocking and controllable supervisor is also maximally
permissive, meaning that it restricts the system as little as possible.
3 Problem statement
The focus of this paper is to generate reduced observers that still preserve relevant
properties, to be able to verify different security notions. It is also shown how supervi-
sors can be generated, avoiding states that do not satisfy desired properties. This sec-
tion presents the main problem statements of the paper, the incremental generation of
reduced observers, and some security notions that will be analyzed by such reduced
observers. First observers only involving local unobservable events are considered,
where all such local events are immediately replaced by ε. The more complex case,
where some unobservable events are shared between different subsystems, means on
the other hand that the shared unobservable events can not be replaced by ε before
they have become local due to synchronization.
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3.1 Incremental abstraction for modular systems
A transition system, including a number of subsystemsGi, i ∈ N+n that are interacting
by synchronous composition, is defined as
G = ‖i∈N+n Gi = G1 ‖G2 ‖· · ·‖Gn. (1)
A straightforward approach to analyze such a modular system is to compute the ex-
plicit monolithic transition system G. However, there are limitations on memory and
computation time in the generation and analysis of such monolithic systems. An al-
ternative approach is to avoid building the explicit monolithic system, by analyzing
each individual subsystem first. In this case, local events of each subsystem are hid-
den and abstracted based on the desired property to be preserved. Moreover, after
every synchronization of subsystems more local events may appear and thus, ad-
ditional abstraction is possible. This step by step combined hiding, abstraction and
synchronization is here called incremental abstraction. In (Flordal and Malik, 2009),
this approach is proposed for verification, and is called compositional verification.
3.2 Incremental observer generation including abstraction
The focus of this paper is on verification of security properties, while a simple exten-
sion towards synthesis is shown in the end of the paper. The security properties are
analyzed by constructing an observer, where only observable events are involved. The
generated observer is deterministic and computed by subset construction (Hopcroft
et al., 2001).
Since the observer generation as well as the synchronization of the subsystems
have exponential complexity, the incremental abstraction mentioned above is of in-
terest. This approach can be applied if the observer generation is divided into lo-
cal observers that are synchronized. When all unobservable events are local, i.e. no
shared unobservable events are involved, it is shown in Section 4 that an observer of
the monolithic system G, denoted O(G), also can be computed by the synchronous
composition of the local observers of its subsystems. Thus,
O(G) = ‖i∈N+n O(Gi). (2)
The security properties considered in this work result in observer states that are ei-
ther safe or non-safe. Introducing the state label N for the non-safe states, visible
bisimulation can be used in an incremental abstraction, still preserving the separation
between the two types of states.
For two synchronized subsystems,G1 ‖G2, the sets of local events in G1 andG2
are Σh1 and Σ
h
2 , respectively, and the events in Σ
h
12 are the shared events between
the two subsystems that become local after the synchronization, see also Example 1.
Thus, the set Σh = Σh1 ∪˙Σ
h
2 ∪˙Σ
h
12 includes all events that can be hidden after the
synchronization. Using the notations GΣ
h
for hiding the events in Σh, GA
Σh
for
abstraction including hiding, and the equivalence GΣ
h
∼ GA
Σh
, it is also shown in
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Section 4 that an abstraction of O(G1 ‖G2)Σ
h
, including the local observer genera-
tion in (2), can be incrementally generated as
O(G1 ‖G2)
Σh∼
(
O(G1)
AΣ
h
1
‖O(G2)
AΣ
h
2
)AΣh12
. (3)
Repeating this incremental abstraction procedurewhenmore subsystems are included
still implies that only observers of individual subsystems O(Gi) are required. Fur-
thermore, the repeated abstraction means that often systems with a moderate state
space are synchronized, especially when a number of local events are obtained after
each synchronization.
Since (3) only includes one type of state label (N ), it can also be expressed in
terms of marked and non-marked states. Therefore, the problem can also be identified
as a non-blocking problem, andmore efficient abstractions (coarser state partitioning)
than visible bisimulation can be used. This is further described in Section 4.
When no explicit set of hidden events is included in the abstraction operator A,
the default set of events to be hidden is assumed to be all local observable events.
Assuming that this set is Σh for transition systemG, it means thatO(G)A
Σh
is often
simplified to O(G)A, where we also note that the observer is generated before the
abstraction is performed.
3.3 Incremental observer generation with shared unobservable events
For systems also including shared unobservable events, such events can not be re-
placed by ε due to the synchronization with other subsystems. This means that a
complete observer can not be computed by composing local observers as in (2) before
subsystems have been synchronized such that no shared unobservable events remain.
On the other hand it is shown in Section 6 that observers can also be computed incre-
mentally, such that shared unobservable events have to be retained, while transitions
with local unobservable events can be removed in a partial observer generation.
To clarify this partial observer generation, the more detailed observer operator
OΣε(G) is introduced, where the subscriptΣε includes the set of local unobservable
events that are replaced by ε before the observer generation. Similar to the sets of
hidden events in (3), the sets of local unobservable events in G1 and G2 are Σε1 and
Σε2 , respectively, and the events in the set Σ
ε
12 are the shared unobservable events
in G1 and G2 that become local after the synchronization G1 ‖G2, see also Exam-
ple 1. Thus, the set Σε = Σε1 ∪˙Σ
ε
2 ∪˙Σ
ε
12 includes all unobservable events that can be
replaced by ε when the observer is generated after the synchronization. In Section 6
it is shown that an observer alternatively can be generated incrementally as
OΣε(G1 ‖G2) = OΣε
12
(
OΣε
1
(G1)‖OΣε
2
(G2)
)
, (4)
where the shared unobservable events in Σε12 are preserved until they become lo-
cal. Also observe the special case with no shared unobservable event (Σε12 = ∅),
where (4) simplifies to (2). Furthermore, the observer generation, combined with the
incremental abstraction, results in the equivalence
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OΣε(G1 ‖G2)
Σh∼ OΣε
12
(
OΣε
1
(G1)
AΣ
h
1
‖OΣε
2
(G2)
AΣ
h
2
)AΣh12
. (5)
Note that the observer generation is always performed before corresponding abstrac-
tion. Observable and unobservable events are here incrementally replaced by τ and ε,
respectively, when they become local. The mix between step-wise abstraction and
partial observer generation means that some events are replaced by ε first after one or
more abstractions. To be able to construct correct partial observers, this implies that
some restrictions must be included in the incremental abstractions. This is solved
in Section 6 by introducing additional temporary state labels (other than labels for
non-safe states).
When no explicit set of unobservable events is included in the observer opera-
tor O, the default set is assumed to be all local unobservable events. Assuming that
this set is Σε for transition system G, it implies that OΣε(G) is often simplified to
O(G), where the observer is generated after the events inΣε have been replaced by ε.
Example 1 This example illustrates the incremental replacement of local events by ε
or τ in (5). The events a, b, c and d are observable, while the events u and v are
unobservable. Fig. 1 shows that the events a, d and v are shared. To generate the
local observers O(Gi), i = 1, . . . , 3, local unobservable events are replaced by ε,
andΣε1 = {u},Σ
ε
2 = ∅, andΣ
ε
3 = ∅. Although event v is unobservable, it is shared
between G1 and G3 and is not replaced by ε at this level. However, it becomes local
after the synchronization G1 ‖G3, which means Σε13 = {v}. Moreover, Σ
ε
12 = ∅
andΣε23 = ∅. In the hiding process of local observable events before abstraction, the
sets of hidden events areΣh1 = {b},Σ
h
2 = {c},Σ
h
3 = ∅,Σ
h
12 = {a},Σ
h
13 = ∅, and
Σh23 = {d}. ✷
G1
0 1 2
3
4
a b
u
v
G2
0 1 2 3
a c d
G3
0 1 2
d v
Fig. 1 Three subsystems with local and shared, observable and unobservable events.
3.4 Opacity and privacy
The two security and privacy properties that are studied in this work are current-state
opacity (CSO) and current-state anonymity (CSA). It is assumed that an intruder
knows the model of the system and has access to the observable events. Thus, an
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intruder can generate an observer of the system, and security and privacy violation
can be formulated as the existence of non-safe states in this observer.
In CSO verification, the states of the observer that exclusively include secret states
are called non-safe states. By definition, a system is current-state opaque, if there
is no non-safe state in the observer. On the other hand, a system is current-state
anonymous, if there is no singleton state in the observer. The singleton states are
considered as non-safe states in CSA verification. In Section 5, both opacity and
anonymity notions for modular systems are described.
Moreover, for the synthesis of current-state opaque/anonymous systems, that is
limited to systems including only local unobservable events, uncontrollable events
are introduced such that an efficient supervision equivalence abstraction can be used
to find the supervisor.
4 Efficient generation of observers
Since the computation of an observer has exponential complexity (Cassandras and
Lafortune, 2008), it is shown in this section how the incremental abstraction in (3) can
be used to significantly lower the computational complexity. All unobservable events
are in this section assumed to be local and can therefore immediately be replaced by ε.
Based on this assumption, it is shown how local observers can be directly generated
before the incremental abstraction is applied.
4.1 Incremental observer abstraction for modular systems
For a nondeterministic transition system G, where unobservable (local) events have
been replaced by ε, a deterministic transition system with the same language asL(G),
called an observer O(G), is generated by subset construction (Hopcroft et al., 2001),
where O(G) = 〈X̂,Σ, T̂ , Î, AP, λ̂〉, and X̂ = {Y ∈ 2X | (∃s ∈ L(G))Y =
δ(I, s)}, T̂ = {Y a→ Y ′ | Y ′ = δ(Y, a)}, and Î = Rε(I). The relation between λ̂(Y )
and λ(x) is application dependent, see Section 5, but the default assumption is that
λ̂(Y ) =
⋃
x∈Y λ(x). An obvious alternative is λ̂(Y ) =
⋂
x∈Y λ(x), an interpretation
that is applied in CSO.
Introduce the transition function δ̂(Y, a) def= δ(Y, a) and the extended transition
function, inductively defined as δ̂(Î , sa) = δ̂(δ̂(Î , s), a) with the base case δ̂(Î , ε)
= Î . It is then easily shown that δ̂(Î , s) = δ(I, s), see (Hopcroft et al., 2001). This
means that L(O(G)) = L(G).
For a modular system (1) with partial observation and no shared unobservable
events, the monolithic observer can be computed by first generating local observers
for each subsystem before they are synchronized. This is possible, since the same
monolithic observer is obtained when synchronization is made before and after ob-
server generation. This was shown for automata by Fabre (2012) and Pola et al.
(2017). A minor extension to transition systems is presented in the following lemma.
The first automata related part of the proof is included due to its simplicity compared
to earlier formulations.
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Lemma 1 (Modular observers) LetGi = 〈Xi, Σi, Ti, Ii, APi, λi〉, i = 1, 2, be two
nondeterministic transition systems with no shared unobservable events, where the
alphabetΣi only includes observable events. Then, the observer for the synchronized
system
O(G1 ‖G2) = O(G1)‖O(G2).
Proof: Consider the language of the synchronized system L(G1 ‖ G2) and the
projection Pi : (Σ1 ∪ Σ2)∗ → Σ∗i for i = 1, 2. After a string s ∈ L(G1 ‖ G2)
has been executed, the set of reachable states can be expressed as Y1 × Y2, where
Yi = {x | (∃x0 ∈ Ii)x0
Pi(s)
=⇒ x}, i = 1, 2.Assume that there are transitions xi
a
⇒ x′i
in Gi for i = 1, 2, where a ∈ Σ1 ∩ Σ2, xi ∈ Yi, and x′i ∈ Y
′
i . Then there is a
corresponding transition (x1, x2)
a
⇒ (x′1, x
′
2) in G1 ‖G2. Thus, subset construction
ofG1 ‖G2 generates the transition Y1×Y2
a
→ Y ′1×Y
′
2 . Since Yi and Y
′
i are also states
in O(Gi), the corresponding transition in O(G1)‖O(G2) is (Y1, Y2)
a
→ (Y ′1 , Y
′
2).
With similar arguments for a ∈ Σ1 \Σ2 and a ∈ Σ2 \Σ1, we find that for a given
string s ∈ L(O(G1 ‖G2)) = L(O(G1) ‖ O(G2)), the reachable states included
in the block states of O(G1 ‖G2) and O(G1) ‖ O(G2) are the same. Indeed, the
bijective function f : 2X1×X2 → 2X1 × 2X2 , where f(Y1 × Y2) = (Y1, Y2) for
Yi ∈ 2
Xi , i = 1, 2, shows that the states in the two transition systems are isomorphic.
The states and transitions are therefore structurally equal.
In Def. 2, the union of the state labels is taken in the synchronization. Together
with the default assumption on union of state labels in observer block states, the state
label of the synchronized block state (Y1, Y2) = f(Y1×Y2) becomes
⋃
x1∈Y1
λ(x1)∪⋃
x2∈Y2
λ(x2). The alternative interpretation for CSO, where union is replaced by in-
tersection in the observer generation, gives
⋂
x1∈Y1
λ(x1)∪
⋂
x2∈Y2
λ(x2) =
⋂
x1∈Y1⋂
x2∈Y2
(
λ(x1) ∪ λ(x2)
)
. The second formulation corresponds to synchronization
before observer generation. The interpretation for CSA is shown in Section 5. ✷
Online estimation This lemma also has implications on online estimation of a modu-
lar system. Clearly, online estimation can be implemented by running local observers
combined with online synchronization. Alternatively, one can simply maintain local
sets of consistent estimates, which get synchronised when necessary (the latter ap-
proach avoids building and storing the local observers ahead of time, by essentially
exploring only the observer states that are visited due to the particular sequence of
observations that is seen). For either approach, the lemma results in a dramatic sim-
plification on the complexity of online estimation.
In the following proposition, abstraction is added to the result of Lemma 1. The
proposition is valid for any abstraction that is congruent with respect to (wrt) syn-
chronization and hiding. The basic idea behind this incremental abstraction can be
traced back to Malik et al. (2004) and Flordal and Malik (2009).
Proposition 1 (Incremental abstraction of modular observers) Let G1 and G2
be two nondeterministic transition systems with no shared unobservable events but
hidden observable events in the set Σh def= Σh1 ∪˙Σ
h
2 ∪˙Σ
h
12, where Σ
h
i includes local
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events in Gi, i = 1, 2, and Σh12 includes shared events in G1 and G2. For an arbi-
trary abstraction equivalenceGΣ
h
∼ GA
Σh
that is congruent wrt synchronization and
hiding, the abstraction of the following observer can be incrementally generated as
O(G1 ‖G2)
Σh∼
(
O(G1)
AΣ
h
1 ‖O(G2)
AΣ
h
2
)AΣh12
.
Proof: Combining Lemma 1 with hiding of the local observable events inG1 and
G2, we find that O(G1 ‖ G2)Σ
h
1 ∪˙Σ
h
2 =
(
O(G1) ‖ O(G2)
)Σh1 ∪˙Σh2 = O(G1)Σh1 ‖
O(G2)
Σh2 . For an arbitrary equivalence G ∼ H , congruence wrt synchronization
means that G ‖R ∼ H ‖R. Thus, O(G1 ‖G2)Σ
h
1 ∪˙Σ
h
2 ∼ O(G1)
AΣ
h
1 ‖O(G2)
Σh2 ∼
O(G1)
AΣ
h
1 ‖O(G2)
AΣ
h
2 . Now, also hiding the shared events in Σh12, combined with
congruence wrt hiding (G ∼ H implies GΣ
h
∼ HΣ
h
) and one more abstraction, we
finally obtainO(G1 ‖G2)Σ
h
1 ∪˙Σ
h
2 ∪˙Σ
h
12 ∼
(
O(G1)
AΣ
h
1 ‖O(G2)
AΣ
h
2
)AΣh12
. ✷
4.2 Incremental observer algorithm
Based on Prop. 1, an incremental observer generation including abstraction is pre-
sented in Algorithm 1 for modular systems without any shared unobservable events.
Algorithm 1 Incremental observer generation including abstraction
input G1, . . . , Gn
output O(G)A
1: for i ∈ N+n do
2: G{i} := O(Gi)
3: end for
4: πΩ := {{1}, {2}, . . . , {n}}
5: repeat
6: Choose Ω1, Ω2 ∈ πΩ according to some heuristics
7: Ω := Ω1 ∪Ω2
8: GΩ := GAΩ1 ‖G
A
Ω2
9: Replace Ω1 and Ω2 by Ω in πΩ
10: until Ω = N+n
11: O(G)A := GA
Ω
Fig. 2 Observer generation and incremental abstraction of a modular transition system G = ‖
i∈N+n
Gi
without any shared unobservable events.
Heuristics In the selection of the sets Ω1 and Ω2 and corresponding transition sys-
tems GΩ1 and GΩ2 , to be abstracted in Algorithm 1, a natural approach is to first
select a group of transition systems with few transitions. Among them, the two sys-
tems with the highest proportion of local events are chosen to be abstracted. In this
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way, a significant reduction of states and transitions is achieved by the abstractions,
and the intermediate system after the synchronization GΩ := GAΩ1 ‖ G
A
Ω2
also be-
comes smaller.
Algorithm1, including these heuristics, is a minor adaption of a method suggested
by Flordal and Malik (2009) for incremental verification. They call it compositional
verification, and the focus is on nonblocking and controllability properties, while the
formulation here is adapted to incremental observer generation and specific observer
properties based on transition systems. The main reason why this algorithm is pre-
sented here is that the nontrivial extension in Section 6, on observer abstraction for
modular systems with shared unobservable events, can be computed in the same way.
The difference is mainly that an additional observer operation is added on line 8.
4.3 Transformation from forbidden state to nonblocking verification
The security related verification and synthesis problems considered in this paper are
all related to identification of specific non-safe observer state properties, see Sec-
tion 3.4. In CSO, observer states that exclusively include secret states from the orig-
inal system are non-safe, and in CSA, singleton observer states are considered as
non-safe states. Non-safe states in an observer may formally be considered as forbid-
den states, and the verification as a forbidden state problem. This verification problem
can be solved by introducing the state label N for the non-safe states, and then use
visible bisimulation as abstraction in Algorithm 1.
Extended local observers Since the problem only includes two types of states, safe
and non-safe, an alternative to generic state labels and visible bisimulation is to trans-
form the forbidden state problem to a nonblocking problem. All forbidden (non-safe)
states in each individual observer O(Gi) are then augmented with a self-loop. For
CSO these self-loops are labeled by wi, i = 1, . . . , n, and the resulting local ob-
servers are called Owi(Gi). For each such observer, a two-state detector automaton
Gdi , shown in Fig. 3, is then introduced. It includes a marked state with a self-loop on
the set of observable eventsΣi inGi and a transition via the eventwi to a non-marked
state. The extended local observer
Oe(Gi) = Owi(Gi)‖G
d
i
then obtains non-marked blocking states added to every occurrence of a wi self-loop
in Owi(Gi). Thus, every forbidden state in O(Gi) results in a direct transition to a
Gdi
0 1
Σi
wi
Fig. 3 Detector automaton Gdi that inserts blocking states related to the forbidden states in Owi (Gi) by
the extended observer Oe(Gi) = Owi (Gi)‖G
d
i .
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blocking state in the extended local observer, while all original states inOwi(Gi) be-
come marked inOe(Gi). The reason is that no state inOwi(Gi) is explicitly marked,
meaning that every state is implicitly considered to be marked in the synchronization.
If any blocking states remain in the total extended observer
Oe(G) = Oe(G1)‖Oe(G2)‖· · ·‖Oe(Gn), (6)
this observer is blocking, and the observerO(G) includes one or more non-safe states
from a CSO point of view.
In the case of CSA, the transformation is simplified by choosing the same self-
loop label w for all observers O(Gi), i = 1, . . . , n, and the same w label in every
detector automaton Gdi . This means that a blocking state may be reached first when
all local observers have reached a non-safe state, a fact that is further motivated in
Section 5.3.
Abstraction preserving nonblocking Conflict equivalence, introduced by Malik et al.
(2004), preserves the nonblocking property of a transition system. This means that a
system is nonblocking if and only if its conflict equivalence abstraction is also non-
blocking. This abstraction, denotedAc, generally generates more efficient reductions
compared to the visible bisimulation abstraction, here denotedAv . The reason is that
only the nonblocking property is preserved byAc, while visible bisimulation, includ-
ing divergence sensitivity, preserves temporal logics similar to CTL∗ (Lennartson and
Noori-Hosseini, 2018).
By introducing the extended observer Oe as observer operator in Algorithm 1,
an incremental observer based on the abstraction Ac is efficiently computed. This is
possible, since conflict equivalence is congruent wrt hiding and synchronization (Ma-
lik et al., 2004). The DES software tool Supremica (Åkesson et al., 2006) includes an
incremental conflict equivalence implementation based on (Flordal and Malik, 2009).
As an alternative, Algorithm 1 can also be implemented based on the visible bisim-
ulation abstraction Av and the original local observers including the non-safe state
label N . Note that this abstraction is also congruent wrt hiding and synchronization
(Lennartson, 2019).
The following example illustrates the transformation of a CSO verification prob-
lem to a nonblocking problem. Furthermore, the efficiency of the conflict equivalence
and the visible bisimulation abstractions is demonstrated.
Example 2 Consider the subsystem Gi, i ∈ N+n in Fig. 4, where vi is a local unob-
servable event and therefore replaced by ε before observer generation. The events ai
and ci are local observable and the events bi and bi+1 are observable but shared be-
tween neighbor subsystems, except the local events b1 and bn+1. The local observer
O(Gi) is also shown in Fig. 4.
The transition system Gi is assumed to have one secret state, state 2. Thus, the
observer state 2 is non-safe from a CSO point of view. This non-safe state with state
labelN in O(Gi) is a forbidden state to which a wi self-loop is added inOwi(Gi) in
Fig. 4. Including the detector automatonGdi as depicted in Fig. 5, gives the extended
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Gi
0 1 2 3
ai ai ai
vicibi, bi+1
O(Gi)
0 1 2
{N}
{2, 3}
ai ai
bi, bi+1
ai
ci
ci
ai
Owi(Gi)
0 1 2 {2, 3}
ai ai
bi, bi+1
ai
wi
ci
ci
ai
Fig. 4 Transition system Gi in Example 2, its local observer O(Gi) including state label N at the non-
safe state 2, and local observer Owi (Gi) that is augmented with a wi-self-loop at the non-safe state 2.
local observer Oe(Gi) = Owi(Gi) ‖G
d
i where the wi self-loop is replaced by a wi
transition to a blocking state, also shown in Fig. 5.
In Table 1 the complexity of the incremental extended observer Oe(G)Ac , in-
cluding abstraction based on conflict equivalence, is compared with the extended
observer without abstraction Oe(G) = ‖i∈N+n Oe(Gi) for different number of sub-
systems n. The result shows the strength of including the incremental abstraction,
where the number of states |X | and transitions |T | including abstraction is constant
independent of n, due to the specific structure of the problem.
Somewhat surprisingly, the incremental visible bisimulation abstractionAv gives
an even larger reduction down to only 2 states and 2 transitions, independent of n.
This is shown in (Noori-Hosseini et al., 2018). The reason why the conflict equiv-
alence abstraction Ac does not achieve such an extreme reduction in this example
is that the extended local observer Oe(Gi) includes an additional blocking state as
a marker for the non-safe state. Thus, it is clear that for systems with special struc-
Gdi
0
1
ai, bi, bi+1, ci
wi
Oe(Gi)
(0, 0) (1, 0) (2, 0) ({2,3}, 0)
(2, 1)
ai ai
bi, bi+1
ai
wi
ci
ci
ai
Fig. 5 The detector automaton Gdi that inserts an additional blocking state to the non-safe state 2 in
Owi (Gi), as depicted in Oe(Gi) = Owi (Gi) ‖ G
d
i .
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Table 1 Comparison of the number of states, transitions and the elapsed time after calculation of the
abstracted extended observer Oe(G)Ac using incremental abstraction based on conflict equivalence, and
the modular extended observer Oe(G) without abstraction.
Oe(G)Ac Oe(G) = ‖i∈N+n
Oe(Gi)
n |X̂| |T̂ | te (ms) |X̂| |T̂ | te (s)
3 8 17 3 125 585 0.028
5 8 17 5 3,125 23,625 0.082
8 8 17 9 390,625 4,640,625 5.49
9 8 17 17 1,953,125 26,015,625 24.32
12 8 17 18 ≈ 50× 106 – –
tures as the one in this example, visible bisimulation can be even more efficient than
conflict equivalence. ✷
5 Opacity and anonymity for modular systems
So far we have shown how a specific type of states in an observer called non-safe
states can be identified in an efficient way for modular systems. In this section a
more detailed definition of these non-safe states is given. This is done for the secu-
rity and privacy problems current state opacity and anonymity, focusing on modular
structures.
A centralized architecture is considered, including one single intruder of the sys-
tem. It is assumed that the intruder has full knowledge of the system structure. How-
ever, it can only observe a subset of the system events, included in the set of observ-
able events. Based on its observations, the intruder is assumed to be able to construct
an observer of the system, where only observable events are included as transition
labels.
5.1 Current state opacity and anonymity
In current-state opacity (CSO) (Saboori and Hadjicostis, 2014; Jacob et al., 2016),
the goal is to evaluate if it is possible to estimate any secret states in a system based
on its observable events. For a transition system G, let XS ⊆ X be the set of secret
states. This system is then said to be opaque if for every string of observable events
s ∈ L(G), each corresponding state set Y = δ(I, s) that includes secret states also
includes at least one non-secret state from the set X \XS . Note that the natural pro-
jection on observable events that often is used in opacity definitions, see for instance
Jacob et al. (2016), is not involved in this section, since the strings s ∈ L(G) only
include observable events. The unobservable events are replaced by ε.
Definition 3 (Current state opacity) Consider a nondeterministic transition sys-
tem G, where any unobservable events are replaced by ε and XS ⊆ X is the set of
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secret states. For a string of observable events s ∈ L(G), the block state Y = δ(I, s)
is safe if Y * XS , and G is current state opaque if for all strings s ∈ L(G), all
corresponding block states Y = δ(I, s) are safe. ✷
Since the block states Y = δ(I, s) in this CSO definition are states in the correspond-
ing observerO(G), the following proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 2 (Current state opacity and safe/non-safe observer states) A tran-
sition system G is current-state opaque if and only if all states in the observerO(G)
are safe. Furthermore, a state Y in O(G) is non-safe if and only if it includes only
secret states fromG, i.e. Y ⊆ XS . ✷
According to this proposition, a transition system G is current-state non-opaque if
and only if at least one state in the observerO(G) includes only secret states fromG,
and is therefore non-safe. The labelN is a state label for all non-safe states inO(G).
Current state anonymity With the increasing popularity of location-based services
for mobile devices, privacy concerns about the unwanted revelation of user’s current
location are raised. For this reason the notion of CSO is adapted, and a new related
notion called current state anonymity (CSA) is introduced (Wu et al., 2014). CSA
captures the observer’s inability to know for sure the current locations of moving
patterns.
Definition 4 (Current state anonymity) Consider a nondeterministic transition
system G, where any unobservable events are replaced by ε. For a string of observ-
able events s ∈ L(G), the block state Y = δ(I, s) is safe if this state set is not
a singleton (|Y | > 1). Furthermore, G is current state anonymous if for all strings
s ∈ L(G), all corresponding block states Y = δ(I, s) are safe. ✷
In the same way as for CSO, the block states Y = δ(I, s) in this CSA definition
are states in the corresponding observer O(G), which directly implies the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 (Current state anonymity and safe/non-safe observer states) A
transition system G is current-state anonymous if and only if all block states in the
observer O(G) are safe. Furthermore, a block state Y in O(G) is safe if and only if
it is not a singleton (|Y | > 1). ✷
According to this proposition, a transition system G is current-state non-anonymous,
if and only if at least one block state Y in the observer O(G) is a singleton and is
therefore non-safe. Obviously, anonymity is evaluated by verifying that no observer
block state is a singleton state. This is natural, since more than one system state in
each observer block state implies an uncertainty in determining the exact location of
a moving pattern. Finally, in the same way as for CSO, the labelN is a state label for
all non-safe (non-anonymous) block states in G and corresponding states in O(G).
The following example shows the observers for CSO and CSA, including their
differentN (non-safe) state label interpretations.
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G
0 1 2 3 XS = {0, 1, 2}
a u b
OCSO(G)
{0}
{N}
{1, 2}
{N}
{3}
a b
OCSA(G)
{0}
{N}
{1, 2} {3}
{N}
a b
OCSO(G)A
{a,b}
{0, 1, 2}
{N}
{3}
τ OCSA(G)
A{a,b}
{0}
{N}
{1, 2} {3}
{N}
τ τ
Fig. 6 A system model G, its two observers OCSO(G) and OCSA(G) when the event u is unobserv-
able, and corresponding VB abstractions OCSO(G)A
{a,b}
and OCSA(G)A
{a,b}
when a and b are local
observable events.
Example 3 Consider the transition system G in Fig. 6 where the secret state set
XS = {0, 1, 2}. The event u is unobservable and is therefore replaced by ε before the
observer generation, where the source and target states of the ε transition are merged.
Although the observers are structurally equal, depending on the verification problem,
the interpretation differs concerning the non-safe states and therefore the state label-
ing. The block state {1, 2} in the observer OCSO(G) has label N , because both states
1 and 2 are secret states. On the other hand, the corresponding state in OCSA(G) does
not have state label N , as it is not a singleton state.
Since G does not include any subsystems, all events can be considered as local,
since no synchronization between local subsystems is performed. The observable
events a and b are therefore hidden by relabeling them with τ . In the visible bisim-
ulation (VB) abstraction OCSO(G)A
{a,b}
, the N -labeled states with a τ transition in
between are merged, while no reduction is achieved for OCSA(G)A
{a,b}
. We notice
that only states with the same state label (label N or no label) are merged in the VB
abstraction. ✷
To summarize this subsection, a block state Y in the observer O(G) is non-safe
and is augmented with state labelN , in CSO verification when Y ⊆ XS , and in CSA
verification when |Y | = 1. These results are now generalized to modular systems.
5.2 Current state opacity and anonymity for modular systems
For a modular transition system G = ‖i∈N+n Gi, CSO requires a modified definition
of secret states. No shared unobservable events also means that both CSO and CSA
can be expressed in terms of safety of the local block states Yi in Gi.
Before CSO is defined for modular systems, consider an n-dimensional cross
product Y = Y1× Y2× · · · ×Yn, where the i-th set Yi is replaced by the set Zi. This
modified cross product is denoted
R(Y, Zi) = Y1 × · · · × Yi−1 × Zi × Yi+1 × · · · × Yn (7)
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Definition 5 (Current state opacity for modular systems) Consider a modular
transition system G = ‖i∈N+n Gi, where XSi is the set of secret states for subsys-
tem Gi. The set of secret states for G with state space X = X1 × · · · ×Xn is then
defined as
XS =
n⋃
i=1
R(X,XSi)
For a string of observable events s ∈ L(G), the block state Y = δ(I, s) of the
modular system G is safe if Y * XS , and G is current state opaque if for all strings
s ∈ L(G), all corresponding block states Y = δ(I, s) are safe. ✷
The only difference between this CSO definition and Def. 3 is the more complex
structure of the set of secret states XS , which is illustrated in the following example.
Example 4 Consider the subsystems G1 and G2 in Fig. 7, where the events a and b
are observable, and u and v are unobservable. Since v is shared, local observers can
not be generated. Thus, G1 and G2 are first synchronized before the unobservable
events are replaced by ε, and the observer O(G1 ‖G2) is generated where the three
block states are Y = {(0, 0)}, Y ′ = {(1, 1), (1, 2)}, and Y ′′ = {(2, 3), (3, 4)}. The
local event u in G2 gives the two states in Y ′, and the shared event v gives the two
states in Y ′′.
The set of secret statesXS = XS1 ×X2 ∪X1×XS2 = {1, 2}× {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}∪
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4} × {4} implies that Y ′ ⊆ XS and Y ′′ ⊆ XS , while Y * XS . Thus,
Y ′ and Y ′′ are non-safe states, which means that the G1 ‖G2 is current state non-
opaque. Due to the union in the definition of secret states in Def. 5, it is enough that
G1 is in the local secret state 1 to make Y ′ a non-safe state in the composed system.
The state Y ′′ is non-safe due to a more complex behavior, where first G1 is in the
local secret state 2 and G2 is in the non-secret state 3. After the shared unobservable
event v has been executed, the opposite occurs where G2 is instead in a local secret
state (state 4), and G1 is in a non-secret state (state 3).
Both in state Y ′ and Y ′′ an intruder is able to detect that one of the subsystems is
in a secret state. In the non-safe state Y ′, the intruder knows thatG1 is in a secret state.
A safe state implies that both a secret and a non-secret state can be occupied. Thus,
G1
0 1 2 3 XS1 = {1, 2}
a b v
G2
0 1 2 3 3 XS2 = {4}
a u b v
O(G1 ‖G2)
Y Y ′
{N}
Y ′′
{N}
a b
Fig. 7 Two subsystems G1 and G2 with observable events a and b, and unobservable events u and v, as
well as the observer of the composed system O(G1 ‖G2) where Y = {(0, 0)}, Y ′ = {(1, 1), (1, 2)},
and Y ′′ = {(2, 3), (3, 4)}.
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O(G1)
{0} {1}
{N}
{2, 3}
a b
O(G2)
{0} {1, 2} {3, 4}
a b
Fig. 8 Local observers for the subsystems G1 and G2 in Fig. 7 when the shared unobservable event v in
G2 is replaced by the local unobservable event w.
there are one or more states in a safe block state where no subsystem is in a secret
state. In Y ′′ one of the subsystems is in a secret state, but the shared unobservable
event v does not make it possible to determine if it isG1 orG2, only that one of them
is in its secret state. ✷
In the next example, it is also shown how the CSO definition in Def. 5 can be
simplified for modular systems where all unobservable events are local.
Example 5 Consider the subsystems G1 and G2 in Fig. 7, where the shared unob-
servable event v in G2 is replaced by the local unobservable event w. No shared
unobservable events give the local observers in Fig. 8. Synchronization of these ob-
servers results in the three states (Y1, Y2)
def
= ({0}, {0}), (Y ′1 , Y
′
2)
def
= ({1}, {1, 2}),
and (Y ′′1 , Y
′′
2 )
def
= ({2, 3}, {3, 4}) in O(G1)‖O(G2).
Taking the union of the state labels in the synchronization according to Def. 2,
the second state (Y ′1 , Y
′
2) becomes non-safe since the second state Y
′
1 = {1} in G1 is
non-safe, while the rest of the states are safe. This result coincides with Def. 5, which
in the sameway as in Example 4 shows that replacing the shared unobservable event v
with the local event w in G2 means that only the second state Y ′ in O(G1 ‖G2) is
non-safe. ✷
This example illustrates that the existence of non-safe block states for modular
systems with only local unobservable events can be decided based on the existence
of local non-safe block states. The following proposition confirms this statement.
Proposition 4 (Non-safe block states for modular systems) Consider a modu-
lar transition system G = ‖i∈N+n Gi, where XSi is the set of secret states for sub-
system Gi, and all unobservable events are local. For a string of observable events
s ∈ L(G), the block state Y = Y1 × · · · × Yn = δ(I, s) of the modular system G is
non-safe, that is Y ⊆ XS =
⋃n
i=1R(X,XSi), if and only if (∃i ∈ N
+
n )Yi ⊆ XSi .
Proof: (⇒) Assume by contradiction that (∀i ∈ N+n )Yi * XSi , which means that
(∀i ∈ N+n )Yi∩Xi\XSi 6= ∅. By the notation (7), this assumption yields Y ∩X \XS
= Y ∩X \
⋃n
i=1 R(X,XSi) = Y ∩
⋂n
i=1 R(X,Xi \XSi) =
⋂n
i=1R(Y, Yi ∩Xi \
XSi) 6= ∅, and we conclude that Y * XS , which is a contradiction.
(⇐) Since (∀j ∈ N+n )Yj ⊆ Xj , it follows that Y = R(Y, Yi) ⊆ R(X,Yi).
Furthermore, assuming that (∃i ∈ N+n )Yi ⊆ XSi , and selecting i such that Yi ⊆ XSi ,
it implies that Y ⊆ R(X,Yi) ⊆ R(X,XSi) ⊆
⋃n
i=1R(X,XSi) = XS . ✷
A block state Y = Y1 × · · · × Yn in G =‖i∈N+n Gi is also a state in the ob-
server O(‖i∈N+n Gi), and according to Lemma 1 the block state Yi is then also a
state in the corresponding local observer O(Gi). Thus, a modular system G without
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shared unobservable events is CSO if there is no non-safe state in any local observer.
The system is still opaque if the states in the global observer that include non-safe
components are not reachable.
The interpretation of CSO from an intruder perspective was discussed in Exam-
ple 4. For a system to be in a non-safe state Y , it is obviously enough, according to
this example and Def. 5, that one of the subsystems is in a secret state for every state
x ∈ Y . Consider, for instance, that each subsystem models one moving pattern, say
a person. It is then not necessary that all persons are in local secret states to get a
global non-safe state. It can be enough with one person, depending on the availabil-
ity of observable events. In another scenario, where only one person is involved, the
person being in a secret state in one subsystem means that the local states of the other
subsystems then represent the absence of the single person. This modeling scenario
is applied in the multiple floor/elevator building in Section 7.
Generally, the modular system model in Def. 5 is very flexible. The definition of
secret states is often natural, as we have tried to motivate above, but alternative defi-
nitions are possible, for instance by replacing the union operator with the intersection
operator, such that XS =
⋂n
i=1 R(X,XSi) = XS1 × · · · ×XSn . A similar type of
intersection is applied when current state anonymity is analyzed for modular systems.
Current state anonymity for modular systems In the following definition, all subsys-
tems must be in a singleton state for the whole system to break the location privacy
for moving patterns.
Definition 6 (Current state anonymity for modular systems) Consider a modular
system G = ‖i∈N+n Gi. For a string of observable events s ∈ L(G), the global block
state Y = δ(I, s) is non-safe if Y = x ∈ X , i.e. Y is a tuple of singleton states. Fur-
thermore,G is current state anonymous if for all strings s ∈ L(G), all corresponding
global block states Y = δ(I, s) are safe, i.e. no global state is a tuple of singleton
states. ✷
According to this definition, a global block state is only non-safe when all local states
are singleton states. The motivation for this interpretation is that the synchronized
subsystems together are assumed to model a map. Location privacy is then violated
if it is possible to get a specific location on such a map. This corresponds to a global
singleton state, involving singleton states for all subsystems.
For a string of observable events s ∈ L(G), the global block state Y = δ(I, s)
in G = ‖i∈N+n Gi is also a state in the observer O(G). Furthermore, for a modular
system without shared unobservable events, Lemma 1 implies that O(G) =‖i∈N+n
O(Gi). The state Y can then also be expressed as Y = Y1 × · · · × Yn, where Yi is a
state in the corresponding local observerO(Gi).
One clear difference between CSO and CSA is, however, the handling of state
labels in the synchronization of the local observers ‖i∈N+n O(Gi). In the case of CSA,
it is then necessary to take the intersection of the actual non-safe state labels N from
the individual subsystems, to generate a correct global state label according to Def. 6.
Thus, in current state anonymity for modular systems, the union of non-safe state la-
belsN in the synchronous composition of observers is replaced by the intersection of
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O(G1)
{0}
{N}
{1}
{N}
{2, 3}
a b
O(G2)
{0}
{N}
{1, 2} {3, 4}
a b
Fig. 9 Local observers for the subsystems G1 and G2 in Fig. 7 when the shared unobservable event v in
G2 is replaced by the local unobservable event w. The non-safe state labels are determined based on CSA.
these state labels from the individual subsystems. The following example illustrates
the differences between CSA and CSO.
Example 6 First, consider the observerO(G) in Fig. 7. The structure of this observer
is the same as for CSA, but the non-safe states are different. Concerning CSA, the
first state Y is non-safe, since it is a singleton state, while the states Y ′ and Y ′′ are
safe.
In Fig. 9 no shared unobservable event is involved, and therefore the observer can
be generated as O(G1) ‖ O(G2). In the local observers the non-safe states are as-
signed to the singleton states. After synchronization, taking the intersection of theN
state labels, only the first state in O(G1) ‖O(G2) is non-safe. This is confirmed by
noting that it is also the only singleton state in O(G1)‖O(G2). ✷
5.3 Transformation of current state opacity and anonymity to nonblocking problems
In Section 4.3 it was shown how CSO and CSA verification can be transformed to
nonblocking problems, when all unobservable events are local. More specifically, a
system G is CSO if the observer Oe(G) in (6) is nonblocking. For CSA, the same
self-loop label w in all observersOe(Gi), i = 1, . . . , n means that a blocking state is
only reached when all local observers have reached a non-safe singleton state. This
models the intersection of all non-safe state labels N in the synchronization of the
individual subsystems, that is required to reach a global non-safe state in the case
of CSA.
5.4 Other types of opacity
Opacity can also be defined based on languages, see Dubreil et al. (2008), Badouel
et al. (2006), and Lin (2011). For a system G with a set of initial states I and a lan-
guage L(G, I), two sublanguages are introduced, a secret language LS ⊆ L(G, I)
and a non-secret language LNS ⊆ L(G, I), where LS ∩ LNS = ∅. Unobserv-
able events are here not replaced by ε. Instead, a projection P from all events to
the observable events is introduced. The system G is then language-based opaque if
LS ⊆ P
−1[P (LNS)].
To verify language-based opacity (LBO), this formulation can be transformed
to CSO as in (Wu and Lafortune, 2013), and then verified based on the techniques
proposed in this paper. This includes a modular formulation of the transformation
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from LBO to CSO. Furthermore, two notions of initial state opacity (ISO) and ini-
tial/final state opacity (IFO), as presented in (Wu and Lafortune, 2013), can also be
transformed to LBO and then to a CSO problem.
6 Observer abstraction for systems with shared unobservable events
For modular systems with partial observation and shared unobservable events, the
observer generation including incremental abstraction presented in Section 4 and Al-
gorithm 1 must be reformulated. The problem is that the complete observer can not
be computed by only synchronizing the local observers as in (2). The reason is that
shared unobservable events can not be replaced by ε before they have become local
after synchronization.
6.1 Incremental observer generation
To highlight this complication, the more expressive observer operator OΣε(G) is
used, where we remind that the subscript Σε includes the set of local unobserv-
able events that are replaced by ε before the observer generation. First, the fol-
lowing lemma shows that an observer can also be generated incrementally. An ob-
server OΣε
1
(G) is then computed, assuming that the events in Σε1 are local and un-
observable. When additional local events in Σε2 are considered, an update of this ob-
server as OΣε
2
(OΣε
1
(G)) is shown to give the same result as generating the observer
OΣε
1
∪˙Σε
2
(G) in one step.
Lemma 2 (Incremental observer generation) Consider a nondeterministic transi-
tion system G with a state set X , an initial state set I , a set of observable events
Σo, and a set of unobservable events Σuo. Let Σε1 ⊆ Σ
uo, Σε2 ⊆ Σ
uo, and Σε =
Σε1 ∪˙Σ
ε
2 be sets of unobservable events that are replaced by ε before corresponding
observer generation. Then
OΣε(G) = OΣε
2
(OΣε
1
(G)).
Proof: For the total event set Σ = Σo ∪Σuo, consider the language L(G) ⊆ Σ∗
and the projections P1 : Σ∗ → (Σ \Σε1)
∗, P2 : (Σ \Σε1)
∗ → (Σ \(Σε1∪˙Σ
ε
2))
∗, and
P : Σ∗ → (Σ \ (Σε1∪˙Σ
ε
2))
∗. After a string s ∈ L(G) has been executed, the
block state in the observer OΣε
1
(G) can be expressed as Y1 = {x ∈ X | (∃x0 ∈ I)
x0
P1(s)
=⇒ x}. The corresponding string t = P1(s), executed by the observer
OΣε
2
(OΣε
1
(G)), results in the block state Y2 = {Y1 ∈ 2X | Î1
P2(t)
=⇒ Y1}, where
Î1 is the initial state of OΣε
1
(G). Moreover, the projection P (s) generates the block
state Y = {x ∈ X | (∃x0 ∈ I)x0
P (s)
=⇒ x} in the observer OΣε(G). The bijective
function f : 22
X
→ 2X , where f(Y2) =
⋃
Y1∈Y2
Y1, together with the fact that
P2(t) = P2(P1(s)) = P (s), finally means that Y = f(Y2) for any string s ∈ L(G).
Hence, the states in the observers OΣε
2
(OΣε
1
(G)) and OΣε(G) are isomorphic, and
the observers are therefore structurally equal.
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The equality also includes the state labels. First consider the default assump-
tion on union of state labels in observer block states, and the block state relation
Y = f(Y2) =
⋃
Y1∈Y2
Y1. Then the state label of a block state Y2 in OΣε
2
(OΣε
1
(G))
is
⋃
Y1∈Y2
⋃
x∈Y1
λ(x) =
⋃
x∈(
⋃
Y1∈Y2
Y1) λ(x) =
⋃
x∈Y λ(x), which is the state
label of the corresponding block state Y = f(Y2) in OΣε(G). Thus, the state la-
bels for the two observers coincide. The alternative interpretation for CSO, where
union is replaced by intersection in the observer generation, gives the same result,
since then
⋂
Y1∈Y2
⋂
x∈Y1
λ(x) =
⋂
x∈(
⋃
Y1∈Y2
Y1) λ(x) =
⋂
x∈Y λ(x). For the CSA
interpretation we refer to Section 5. ✷
Combing this lemma with Lemma 1 for G = G1 ‖ G2, assuming that Σε =
Σε1 ∪˙Σ
ε
2 ∪˙Σ
ε
12, where Σ
ε
12 includes the shared unobservable events in G1 and G2
that become local after the synchronizationG1 ‖G2, we find that
OΣε(G1 ‖G2) = OΣε
12
(
OΣε
1
∪˙Σε
2
(G1 ‖G2)
)
= OΣε
12
(
OΣε
1
(G1)‖OΣε
2
(G2)
)
(8)
Based on this result it is obvious that, in the case of unobservable shared events, the
equalityOΣε(G1 ‖G2) = OΣε
1
(G1)‖OΣε
2
(G2) does not always apply. This fact was
also recently highlighted by an example in Masopust (2018).
6.2 Combined incremental observer generation and abstraction
The challenge is now to combine the incremental observer generation in (8) with
the incremental abstraction in Algorithm 1, here based on visible bisimulation since
conflict equivalence is not applicable. If some unobservable events are shared and
therefore cannot immediately be replaced by ε, while some observable events are
local and can be replaced by τ and then abstracted, the question is if it is possible to
perform abstraction before observer generation. The next example illustrates that this
is not always possible. Before this example, two important remarks are given.
(i) Initial local observers are always assumed to be generated before any hiding
and abstraction. This means that every transition system G in this section is by
default an observer, although not explicitly expressed to simplify the notation.
Thus,G is assumed to be deterministic (except in the final Theorem 1), and any
non-safe states are labeled by N .
(ii) Hiding and abstraction are always performed on deterministic systems. Hence,
alternative choices, including τ events after hiding, are interpreted as determin-
istic choices in observer generation. Restrictions will also be included such that
repeated observer generation and abstraction (presented later in this section)
still means thatG can be regarded as a deterministic transition system, although
it may include alternative choices involving τ events.
Example 7 Consider the deterministic transition system G in Fig. 10, where the
events a and b are observable, while u is unobservable, and the first three states have
labelN . In the observerO{u}(G)A
{a,b}
, the unobservable event is first replaced by ε
and the CSO observer is generated followed by visible bisimulation abstraction, while
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G
0
{N}
1
{N}
2
{N}
3
a b u
O{u}(G)
{0}
{N}
{1}
{N}
{2, 3}
a b O{u}(G)
A{a,b}
{0, 1}
{N}
{2, 3}
τ
GA
{a,b}
{0, 1, 2}
{N}
{3}
u
O{u}(G
A{a,b} )
{{0, 1, 2}, {3}}
Fig. 10 Different order between observer generation and abstraction for transition system G.
the observable events are first hidden and abstracted in O{u}(GA
{a,b}
), followed by
the CSO observer generation.
State labels are preserved by visible bisimulation abstraction. This implies that
abstracted block states with label N only include states that before the abstraction
were also labeled by N . Thus, observer generation before abstraction results in the
correct solution, and the model O{u}(G)A
{a,b}
in Fig. 10 shows that the states 0 and
1 are non-safe.
Making the abstraction before the observer generation generates in this example
a different and therefore incorrect result. The reason is that the states are then merged
in wrong blocks inGA
{a,b}
, where state 2 is incorrectly joined with the states 1 and 0.
In the observer generation, where the non-safe block state {0, 1, 2} is merged with
the safe state 3, the result is that the two states 0 and 1 incorrectly become safe. ✷
Avoiding abstractions that influence observer generation Shared unobservable events
mean that we need to repeat the observer generation when subsystems have been syn-
chronized, since additional local unobservable events result in more ε transitions. At
the same time, observable events must be abstracted when they become local, to
avoid state space explosion. Thus, it is necessary to switch between abstraction and
observer generation when subsystems are synchronized. According to Example 7 this
is not possible without introducing some abstraction restrictions.
To avoid that any abstraction of a transition system influences later observer gen-
erations, additional state labels are added, assuming that some unobservable events
have not yet been replaced by ε. Unique state labels are then added to Σuo source
and target states.
Definition 7 (Σuo source and target states) For a deterministic transition sys-
tem G, with a state set X and a set Σuo of unobservable events, the states in the
set
XΣ
uo
st = {x, x
′ ∈ X | (∃u ∈ Σuo)x
u
→ x′}
are called Σuo source and target states (STSs). ✷
Adding unique state labels for all Σuo STSs means that visible bisimulation abstrac-
tion can be performed before observer generation. This is now illustrated for the
transition system in Fig. 10.
28 Mona Noori-Hosseini, Bengt Lennartson and Christoforos N. Hadjicostis
G
0
{N}
1
{N}
2
{N, λus }
3
{λut }
a b u
GA
{a,b}
{0, 1}
{N}
2
{N, λus }
3
{λut }
τ u
O{u}(G
A{a,b} )
{0, 1}
{N}
{2, 3}
τ
Fig. 11 Unique Σuo STS labels λus and λ
u
t added to transition systemG, resulting in a correct observer
O{u}(G
A{a,b} ) where visible bisimulation abstraction is performed before observer generation.
Example 8 The same transition system G as in Example 7 is considered, where
unique state labels λus and λ
u
t are added to the source and target states of the transition
2
u
→ 3. These Σuo STS labels prevent the visible bisimulation abstraction GA
{a,b}
to merge state 2 with the states 0 and 1, since they have now different state labels.
The succeeding CSO observer generationO{u}(G)A
{a,b}
merges the source and tar-
get states of the transition 2 u→ 3, and the obsoleteΣuo STS labels are removed. The
resulting observerO{u}(G)A
{a,b}
in Fig. 11 now coincides with the correct observer
O{u}(G)
A{a,b} in Fig. 10. ✷
Future nondeterministic choices Generally, an observer transforms a nondetermin-
istic system to a language equivalent deterministic system. Based on Algorithm 1,
the first operation generates an observer for every subsystem, which implies that any
multiple initial states are replaced by one initial state in every initial observer, before
any abstraction is made. Furthermore, nondeterministic choices are removed in the
initial observer generation. However, additional nondeterministic choices may appear
after additional ε transitions have been introduced. The following example illustrates
this phenomenon and resulting complications.
Example 9 Consider the deterministic transition system G in Fig. 12, where the
events a, b and c are observable, while u is unobservable. Additional Σuo STS la-
bels λus and λ
u
t are therefore also introduced in G. Making an abstraction before the
observer generation implies that the event a can not be replaced by τ , since a future
nondeterministic choice occurs when u is replaced by ε. Thus, consider the abstrac-
tion GA
{b,c}
in Fig. 12 where b and c have been replaced by τ , and the block state
{3, 4} has been generated. Generating the CSO observerO{u}(GA
{b,c}
), followed by
one more abstraction O{u}(GA
{b,c}
)A
{a}
, verifies that this observer coincides with
the observer O{u}(G)A
{a,b,c}
that is always correct, since no abstraction is made
before the observer generation.
This example indicates that abstraction can also be included before future non-
deterministic choices have been removed by observer generation. Unfortunately, ad-
ditional complications sometimes show up, in this example when event c is replaced
by event b in G. Starting with visible bisimulation abstraction means that GA
{b}
and O{u}(GA
{b}
)A
{a}
coincide with GA
{b,c}
and O{u}(GA
{b,c}
)A
{a}
, respectively,
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G
0
{λus }
1
{λut }
2 3
{N}
4
{N}
a
u
b
a c c
GA
{b,c}
{0}
{λus }
{1}
{λut }
{2} {3, 4}
{N}
a
u
τ
a τ
O{u}(G)
A{a,b,c} = O{u}(G
A{b,c} )A
{a}
{0, 1, 2} {3, 4}
{N}
τ
Fig. 12 Different order between observer generation and abstraction for transition system G, including
a nondeterministic choice when u is replaced by ε.
in Fig. 12. Thus, the observer where abstraction is involved before observer gener-
ation incorrectly includes a non-safe state, see Fig. 13, while the correct observer
O{u}(G)
A{a,b} in Fig. 13 has no non-safe state. ✷
O{u}(G)
A{a,b}
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
O{u}(G
A{b} )A
{a}
{0, 1, 2} {3, 4}
{N}
τ
Fig. 13 Different order between observer generation and abstraction for transition system G in Fig. 12,
when the event c is replaced by event b.
This example illustrates that even if an event label is preserved, which in the future
will result in a nondeterministic choice, in this example event a, incorrect results may
occur. Because correct results are often achieved, special rules can be established, but
it is hard to define exactly when such rules give correct results.
Our conclusion is therefore that abstractions of subsystems should not be per-
formed before future nondeterministic choices have been removed by synchroniza-
tion of subsystems and observer generation. Thus, it is necessary to exactly define a
future nondeterministic choice.
Definition 8 (Future nondeterministic choice) For a deterministic transition sys-
temGwith a state setX , a setΣo of observable events, and a setΣuo of unobservable
events, consider the set of transition relation sets
Tnc = {(x, a, Y
′) ∈ X ×Σo ∪Σuo × 2X |
(∃x′, x′′ ∈ Y ′)(∃su, sv ∈ (Σ
uo\{a})∗)x
sua
→ x′ ∧ x
sva
→ x′′ ∧ x′ 6= x′′ }.
The tuple (x, a, x′), where x ∈ Y ′ and (x, a, Y ′) ∈ Tnc, is called a future nondeter-
ministic choice (FNC) transition. ✷
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First, we observe that the complexity of finding FNC transitions is in worst case
O(|X ||T |). However, the strings su and sv are normally short, which means that
worst case complexity is irrelevant. More importantly, the evaluation of FNC transi-
tions is made on the original submodulesGi in (1), which are expected to be relatively
small.
The exclusion of FNC transitions is only a minor restriction. First, note that un-
observable identical events, not yet replaced by ε, but generating FNC transitions,
can without loss of generality be renamed to avoid such transitions that later nev-
ertheless will be replaced by ε transitions. Observe that nondeterministic choice is
the main reason for the well known worst case exponential state space complexity in
observer generation. Thus, it is indeed recommended to accomplish this renaming,
which of course also influences other submodels, including the same shared unob-
servable events.
For observable events, the expectation is that any nondeterministic choice is mod-
eled explicitly, without adding unobservable events before a nondeterministic choice
(as event u in Example 9). Explicit nondeterminism is then removed in the initial
observer generation. Note that in this special case, where su and sv are empty strings
for (x, a, Y ′) ∈ Tnc, this relation can also be expressed by the function Y ′ = δ(x, a).
To summarize, the assumption from now on is that all nondeterminism, except
possible future ε transitions, is taken care of in the initial observer generation.
Incremental observer generation and abstraction Based on the definitions of Σuo
STSs and FNC transitions, we are now ready to prove Lemma 3. This lemma states
that a deterministic system including observer generation is equivalent to a system
where abstraction is performed before the observer generation. The abstraction is
assumed to be based on visible bisimulation.
We remind again that hiding and abstraction are always assumed to be performed
on deterministic systems. Hence, alternative choices including τ events are inter-
preted as deterministic choices in observer generation. Also note that CSO and CSA
observer generation only considers the non-safe N labels, not the unique Σuo STS
labels, which are only included to avoid abstractions that influence the resulting state
labels in the observer generation, see Fig. 10. When states in ε transitions are merged
in the observer generation, related unique STS labels are also removed, since they are
then obsolete.
Due to the length of the following proof, an example is given after the proof where
the relation between specific state sets and partitions is illustrated.
Lemma 3 (Abstraction before observer generation)Consider a deterministic tran-
sition systemG = 〈X,Σo∪Σuo, T, I, AP, λ〉whereΣo is a set of observable events
and Σuo is a set of unobservable events. Let Σh and Σε be sets of local events that
are replaced by τ and ε, respectively. Moreover, assume that unique state labels for
all Σuo STSs are included in G, while no FNC transition exists in G. Then
OΣε(G)
Σh ∼ OΣε(G
AΣ
h
),
where the abstraction is based on visible bisimulation.
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Proof: The state set X is naturally divided into Xo, the set of states with ob-
servable transitions to and/or from states in Xo, and the set of Σuo STSs XΣuo ,
i.e. X = Xo∪˙XΣuo . Note that border states in between observable and unobserv-
able transitions belong to XΣuo . The main point of this proof is to show the separa-
tion between the abstraction, mainly acting on Xo, and the observer generation that
only affectsXΣuo .
Before the observer generation, the unobservable events in Σε are replaced by ε,
and the transition relations in T can then be divided into three parts: TΣ
o
includ-
ing observable transitions, TΣ
ε
only including ε transitions, and TΣ
uo\Σε including
remaining transitions with unobservable events, i.e. T = TΣ
o
∪˙TΣ
ε
∪˙ TΣ
uo\Σε .
The observer generation OΣε(·) only affects the states in XΣuo . The reason is
that the transition functionG is deterministic before the introduction of ε transitions,
and it does not include any FNC transitions. It means that for any choice of Σε, the
transition relations in TΣ
o
∪˙TΣ
uo\Σε are all deterministic. More specifically, intro-
ducing the set
XΣuoOΣε = {Y ∈ 2
X | (∃x ∈ X)(∃a ∈ Σo∪˙Σuo\Σε)(∃x′ ∈ XΣuo)
x
a
→ x′ ∧ Y = Rε(x
′)}
the observer state set can then be expressed as XOΣε = X
o∪˙XΣuoOΣε . Since the states
inXΣuoOΣε are block states, the states inX
o are now also considered as singleton block
states. The fact that the observer generation only affects the states in XΣuo is also
valid for the observer state label updates for CSO and CSA. It is however critical that
both the source and target states of ε transitions are included inXΣuo , see Fig. 10.
The structure of the observer state set XOΣε = X
o∪˙XΣuoOΣε also implies that
hiding of events for observable transitions in TΣ
o
can be performed either before
or after the observer generation. The only difference between TΣ
o
and the observer
based version TΣ
o
OΣε
is that any target states x′ ∈ XΣuo for transitions in TΣ
o
are
replaced by block target states Y ∈ XΣuoOΣε for transitions in T
Σo
OΣε
. This does not
influence the hiding mechanism that only changes the observable events in Σh to τ .
Thus, OΣε(G)Σ
h
= OΣε(G
Σh).
Now, consider the abstraction part, where the visible bisimulation partition Π
for GΣ
h
is divided in the same way as the state set X = Xo∪˙XΣuo such that
Π
def
= Πo∪˙ΠΣ
uo
. Since all states in XΣ
uo
have unique state labels, correspond-
ing block states in ΠΣ
uo
are singletons. This means that the abstraction only acts on
the partition Πo, resulting in possible non-singleton block states. Also note that the
block states in Π are the states of GA
Σh
.
The statesXOΣε = X
o∪˙XΣuoOΣε of the observerOΣε(G
Σh) only change the states
in the unobservable part fromXΣuo toXΣuoOΣε . Assume first that the unique STS labels
still remain when ε transitions are merged in the observer generation. Every block
state in XΣuoOΣε then has a unique state label. This implies that the visible bisimula-
tion partition after the observer generation can be expressed asΠOΣε = Π
o∪˙XΣuoOΣε ,
where once again the abstraction only acts on the partitionΠo. Thus, the abstraction
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only influences Xo and generates the same partition Πo both with and without ob-
server generation. The abstraction is therefore completely separated from observer
generation.
Finally, the removal of the unique but obsolete Σε STS labels after the observer
generation generally results in a coarser partition ΠO  ΠOΣε . In the search for
the coarsest partition ΠO the question is then if the same visible bisimulation par-
tition is achieved starting from the state space XOΣε = X
o∪˙XΣuoOΣε of the observer
OΣε(G)
Σh = OΣε(G
Σh) or the state space ΠOΣε = Π
o∪˙XΣuoOΣε of the observer
OΣε(G
AΣ
h
)? Since all individual states of a block in a visible bisimulation partition
have the same set of event-target-blocks according to Def. 1, a coarser partition just
means that more states have the same set of event-target-blocks. Thus, it is no re-
striction to start with a state space where the states in each block state have the same
set of event-target-blocks as inΠOΣε . A coarser partitionΠO only implies that some
block states inΠOΣε will be merged, more exactly those that generate the same set of
event-target-blockswhen the obsoleteΣε STS labels are removed, see further details
in Lennartson (2019) and Example 10.
To summarize, the visible bisimulation partition for OΣε(GA
Σh
) is the same as
for OΣε(G)Σ
h
also for the coarser partition ΠO , where the unique state labels for
the Σε STSs are removed, and thereforeOΣε(G)Σ
h
∼ OΣε(G
AΣ
h
). ✷
Example 10 Consider the deterministic transition systemG in Fig. 14 (assumed to be
an observer), where Σo = Σh = {a, b}, Σuo = {u, v, w}, and Σε = {u, v}. Based
on the notations in Lemma 3, the involved state sets areXo = {0, 1, 4, 8, 9},XΣ
uo
=
{2, 3, 5, 6, 7}, and XΣ
uo
OΣε
= {{2, 3}, {5, 6}, {7}}. The involved visible bisimulation
partitions are Πo = {{0, 1}, {4}, {8, 9}}, ΠΣ
uo
= {{2}, {3}, {5}, {6}, {7}}, and
ΠΣuoOΣε = X
Σuo
OΣε
. The block states in ΠOΣε = Π
o∪˙ΠΣuoOΣε = {{0, 1}, {2, 3}, {4},
{5, 6}, {7}, {8, 9}} are the states of OΣε(G
AΣ
h
), see Fig. 14. In the observer, the
obsolete Σε STS labels have been removed. Taking this into account, the visible
bisimulation partitions forOΣε(G)Σ
h
andOΣε(GA
Σh
) are equal, both beingΠO =
G
0
{N}
1
{N}
2
{λus }
3
{N, λut }
4 5
{λvs}
6
{λvt , λ
w
s }
7
{λwt }
8 9
a b u a b v w a b
OΣε(G)
Σh
{0}
{N}
{1}
{N}
{2, 3} {4} {5, 6}
{λws }
{7}
{λwt }
{8} {9}
τ τ τ τ w τ τ
OΣε(G
AΣ
h
)
{0, 1}
{N}
{2, 3} {4} {5, 6}
{λws }
{7}
{λwt }
{8, 9}
τ τ τ w τ
Fig. 14 Transition systemG, corresponding observerOΣε (G)Σ
h
, and abstraction followed by observer
OΣε(G
AΣ
h
) for Σh = {a, b} and Σε = {u, v}.
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{{0, 1}, {2, 3, 4}, {5, 6},{7}, {8, 9}}. This confirms Lemma 3, which says that these
two observers are visible bisimulation equivalent. ✷
Based on Lemmas 1-3 and Prop. 1, the following theorem shows how an ab-
stracted observer for a modular system including shared unobservable events can be
generated incrementally by combining observer generation and abstraction.
Theorem 1 (Incremental observer generation and abstraction) Let G1 and G2
be two nondeterministic transition systems with hidden observable events in the set
Σh
def
= Σh1 ∪˙Σ
h
2 ∪˙Σ
h
12, where Σ
h
i includes local events in Gi, i = 1, 2, and Σ
h
12
includes shared events inG1 andG2. Furthermore, letΣuo be the set of unobservable
events for G1 ‖ G2, where Σε
def
= Σε1 ∪˙Σ
ε
2 ∪˙Σ
ε
12 ⊆ Σ
uo and the events in Σεi are
local for Gi, i = 1, 2, while the events in Σε12 are shared events in G1 and G2. Also,
assume that unique state labels for Σuo \(Σε1∪˙Σ
ε
2) STSs are included in Gi, while
no FNC transition exists in Gi for i = 1, 2. Then, a visible bisimulation abstraction
of the observerOΣε(G1 ‖G2)Σ
h
can be incrementally generated as
OΣε(G1 ‖G2)
Σh ∼ OΣε
12
(OΣε
1
(G1)
AΣ
h
1 ‖OΣε
2
(G2)
AΣ
h
2 )A
Σh
12 .
Proof: Based on Lemma 2, (8), and G = G1 ‖G2 in Lemma 3 we find that
OΣε(G1 ‖G2)
Σh1 ∪˙Σ
h
2 ∼ OΣε
12
(
(OΣε
1
(G1)‖OΣε
2
(G2))
AΣ
h
1
∪˙Σh
2
)
.
Together with Prop. 1 and hiding of the events in Σh12 on the left side, as well as an
additional abstractionAΣ
h
12 on the right side, this gives
OΣε(G1 ‖G2)
Σh1 ∪˙Σ
h
2 ∪˙Σ
h
12 ∼ OΣε
12
(
OΣε
1
(G1)
AΣ
h
1 ‖OΣε
2
(G2)
AΣ
h
2
)AΣh12
,
which proves the theorem. ✷
The first local observer generations OΣε
i
(Gi), i = 1, 2, remove multiple initial
states, non-deterministic choices and local unobservable events. The achieved ob-
servers guarantee that the following local hiding and abstraction is performed on
deterministic systems. The critical point investigated in Lemma 3, including some
minor restrictions, is that local abstractions can be accomplished before shared unob-
servable events are removed by the observer generationOΣε
12
. This is followed by an
additional abstractionAΣ
h
12 of the shared observable events that are only involved in
G1 ‖G2.
This procedure is repeated in the same way as in Algorithm 1, which means that
the state space explosion can be reduced significantly by the incremental abstraction,
also for modular systems with shared unobservable events.
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Algorithm An algorithm for incremental observer generation and abstraction in the
presence of shared unobservable events, presented in Theorem 1 for two subsystems,
is generalized in the same way as in Algorithm 1. The only differences are that on
line 2 unique state labels for source and target states of shared unobservable transi-
tions are introduced after the observer generation, and line 8 is replaced with
GΩ := O((GΩ1 )
A ‖(GΩ2)
A).
In all abstractions, new local observable events are hidden, and in all observer genera-
tions, new local unobservable events are replaced by ε. After the observer generation
on line 8, all obsolete state labels are also removed, as mentioned before Lemma 3.
Finally, note that no observer generation is necessary when there are no shared
unobservable events in GΩ1 and GΩ2 . A complement in the heuristics on selection
of the sets Ω1 and Ω2 is therefore to also focus on subsystems that have shared un-
observable events as early as possible. In this way, extra observer generations can be
significantly reduced.
7 Opacity verification of a multiple floor/elevator building
In order to demonstrate the practical use of the modular and incremental verification
procedure, a CSO problem is formulated based on an n-story building with m ele-
vators on each floor. The model is inspired by an analytical and monolithic building
example in Dubreil et al. (2010).
First, for better understanding of the problem, explicit results for the special case
n = 2 andm = 2 are presented in the following example.
Example 11 Transition systems for a two-story building with floor models F 1 and
F 2 and elevator models E1 and E2 are shown in Fig. 15. Each floor consists of two
corridors and two elevators. Elevator entrances are located in states 2 and 4 in F i
and Ej for i, j = 1, 2. There are card readers in the corridors and elevators, which
are represented by the events cij and e
i
j , respectively. The subscript j indicates the
corridor and elevator and the superscript i corresponding floor. The events uj and
dj indicate the upward and downward movement of the j-th elevator, respectively.
The shared elevator event eij coordinates floor i with elevator j, and the alternative
choices with equal events, ci1 in state 2 and c
i
2 in state 4, plus arbitrary initial states
(IF
i
= XF
i
and IE
j
= XE
j
) generate the non-determinism of the system.
The observer of the i-th floor O(F i) is also shown in Fig. 15, where opacity
depends on the choice of secret states. Assume that there are only secret states in the
second floor model F 2, which means that there can only be non-safe states in the
observer O(F 2). The opacity of the total system F1 ‖ F2 ‖ E1 ‖ E2 ‖ is therefore
determined by the state labels of O(F 2). If the secret state is XF
2
S = {1} or X
F 2
S =
{3}, the system is opaque, since all block states in O(F 2) then include non-secret
states, meaning that all states are safe. On the other hand,XF
2
S = {1, 3} results in a
non-opaque system, since the state {1, 3} in O(F 2) then becomes non-safe. ✷
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Fig. 15 Floor plan model F i for the i-th floor, elevator model Ej for the j-th corridor cj , and observer
O(F i) for the i-th floor.
Building with n floors and m elevators Consider an n-story building with m eleva-
tors on each floor. The transition system models of floors and elevators are depicted
in Fig. 16. There are n floor models F i, i ∈ N+n andm elevator models E
j , j ∈ N+m.
Each floor consists of corridors, rooms and elevators. Elevator entrances are located
in states 2, 4, . . . , 2m − 2, 2m in F i and states 2, 4, . . . , 2n − 2, 2n in Ej . Corri-
dors are connected through doors that open using card readers. The card readers are
installed at the entrances of the elevators. Passing through the entrances of corridors
and elevators are shown by events c and e, respectively. Note that cij (e
i
j) indicates the
j-th corridor (elevator) on the i-th floor. The events uj and dj represent the upward
and downward movement of the j-th elevator, respectively.
The shared elevator event eij coordinates floor i with elevator j, and in state 2j
on floor i an alternative choice with equal event, cij , as well as arbitrary initial states
generate the system non-determinism. The staff moving patterns can be tracked by
observing the records of their ID cards that are read by the card readers. All floors
have similar structure, but have different secret states which are places in the building
that have a storage for secret documents.
Two scenarios One member of the staff wants to place a secret document in one
of the secret locations in the building. There is an intruder that knows the structure
of the system and has access to the records of card readers. The question is then
if the intruder can have the knowledge that the secret document is in that specific
location. In this case, an opaque system means that even a very careless staff with no
specific strategy can place the secret document in any of the secret places, without
being concerned of the secret being revealed. Most opacity examples have only one
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Fig. 16 Floor plan model F i for the i-th floor and elevator model Ej for the j-th corridor cj .
strategy for reaching to an opaque solution, while in this example, no specific strategy
is needed as long as the system is opaque.
As an alternative scenario, consider the case when some card readers do not work
due to power failure. Since corresponding doors in that case cannot be opened, related
transitions are then removed.
Results The CSO verification results for the building in Fig. 16, with different num-
ber of floors and elevators, are presented in Table 2 for non-opaque systems. Results
for the alternative scenario, where some doors can not be opened due to power failure,
are shown in Table 3. Restrictions are then introduced such that all systems become
opaque.
In the first column of both tables, the pair (n,m) shows the number of floors
and elevators. The second column in Table 2 includes the set of secret states on each
floor. The set of secret states in Table 3 are the same as in Table 2, but omitted due to
shortage of space. The column in both tables that is indicated with a ⋆ sign, shows the
floors with local non-safe states, and in Table 3 also the corridors where card readers
do not work.
The number of states |X̂ | and transitions |T̂ |, as well as the elapsed time for the
verification te, are then presented for observers with abstractionO(G)A and without
abstraction O(G). The verification is based on the transformation to a nonblocking
problem, including conflict equivalence abstraction, as presented in Section 4.3.
The results in Tables 2 and 3 clearly demonstrate the strength of including the
incremental abstraction. The number of states in Table 3 for three floors and four
elevators is more than 1000 times larger when abstraction is not included, and no
solution is obtained without abstraction for the larger systems. We also observe that
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Table 2 Results for non-opaque systems, where the number of states and transitions plus execution time
are given for observers with abstraction O(G)A and without abstraction O(G). The ⋆ sign column shows
the floors with local non-safe states.
F i/Ej-model O(G)A =‖ O(Gi)A O(G) =‖ O(Gi)
(n,m) Xis ⋆ |X̂| |T̂ | te (ms) |X̂| |T̂ | te (ms)
(1,1) XF
1
S = {1} F
1 9 13 2 7 11 8
(1,3) XF
1
S = {1, 2, 3} F
1 26 50 4 19 39 9
(2,2)
XF
1
S = {3}
XF
2
S = {1, 5}
F 2 49 127 5 775 2,913 15
(2,3)
XF
1
S
= {3}
XF
2
S = {1, 5}
F 2 25 52 5 3,823 14,567 44
(3,3)
XF
1
S
= {1}
XF
2
S
= {1, 3}
XF
3
S = {1, 5}
F 2
F 3
32 89 6 347,445 1,732,836 10,918
(3,4)
XF
1
S
= {1}
XF
2
S
= {1, 3}
XF
3
S = {5, 7}
F 2
F 3
42 118 7 ≈ 2.6 · 106 o.m. –
(4,3)
XF
1
S
= {1}
XF
2
S
= {1, 3}
XF
3
S = {1, 5}
XF
4
S = {1, 2, 3}
F 2
F 3
F 4
32 105 4 ≈ 16 · 106 o.m. –
(5,3)
XF
2
S
= {1, 3}
XF
3
S = {1, 5}
XF
4
S = {1, 2, 3}
XF
5
S = {3, 4, 5}
F 2
F 3
F 4
F 5
32 121 9 ≈ 22.6 · 106 o.m. –
for the non-opaque case in Table 2 the computation does not continue when one of the
non-safe states has been found, which makes it much faster than the verification of
opaque systems, where the whole reachable state space (although abstracted) needs
to be evaluated.
8 Opacity and anonymity enforcement
For a transition system G, with non-safe block states defined for CSO in Def. 3 and
CSA in Def. 4, it will now be shown how opacity/anonymity can be enforced by a
supervisor S. Only safe block states will then be reachable in the controlled (closed
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Table 3 Results for opaque systems, where number of states and transitions plus execution time are
given for observers with abstraction O(G)A and without abstraction O(G). The ⋆ sign column shows the
corridors where card readers do not work.
F i/Ej-model O(G)A =‖ O(Gi)A O(G) =‖ O(Gi)
(n,m) ⋆ |X̂| |T̂ | te (ms) |X̂| |T̂ | te (ms)
(1,1) (c11) 2 1 1 2 2 7
(1,3) (c1
1
) 12 19 3 12 24 8
(2,2) (e2
1
) 13 30 7 487 2,014 12
(2,3) (c23) 44 112 10 1,699 6,450 24
(3,3) (c2
1
, c3
3
) 266 1,048 45 75,520 380,508 1,673
(3,4) (c2
1
, c3
3
) 413 1,667 106 591,867 3,042,099 18,058
(4,3) (c21, c
3
3, c
4
1) 3,043 17,807 10,530 ≈ 2 · 10
6 o.m. –
(5,3) (c2
1
, c3
3
, c4
1
, c5
2
) 19,556 142,087 24’, 39” ≈ 23.1 · 106 o.m. –
loop) system. Two assumptions that simplify the computation of the supervisor are
introduced:
(i) All unobservable events are assumed to be uncontrollable. Since only observ-
able events are then controllable and therefore can be disabled by the supervisor,
it can be generated by the observerO(G) that is relevant for the actual security
problem. The assumption is the same as in Saboori and Hadjicostis (2012), but
a simpler CSO formulation is presented here.
(ii) All unobservable events are assumed to be local. This means that the observer
O(G) of a modular system (1) can be obtained by synchronizing local ob-
servers (2), and efficient abstractions can be used in the supervisor synthesis.
The input to the supervisor S from the transition system G only includes observ-
able events, and S restricts the behavior of the controlled system by disabling some
controllable events (Ramadge and Wonham, 1989; Kumar and Garg, 1995). Since all
controllable events here are also assumed to be observable, the information to and
from the supervisor only involves observable events. Thus, the nondeterministic tran-
sition system G is perfectly represented by its observer O(G) in the synthesis and
implementation of the supervisor S. This means that the closed loop system, where
S is also represented as an automaton, can be modeled as O(G)‖S.
8.1 Observer based supervisor generation
The non-safe block states in G that must be avoided by the supervisor are deter-
mined by the observerO(G), according to Props. 2 and 3. These states are now called
forbidden states and included in the set X̂f . Since no other state labels are consid-
ered, the observer is simplified from an arbitrary transition system to the automaton
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O(G) = 〈X̂,Σ, T̂ , Î〉. Furthermore, a restricted observer automaton is introduced
O(G)\X̂f = 〈X̂ \X̂f , Σ, T̂\X̂f , Î \X̂f〉
where T̂\X̂f = {(Y, a, Y
′) ∈ T̂ |Y, Y ′ /∈ X̂f}. Hence, O(G)\X̂f is the automaton
where all forbidden states are excluded.
If all events in O(G) are controllable, the automaton S = O(G)\X̂f is the max-
imally permissive supervisor for the closed loop system O(G) ‖S. When also some
observable transitions are uncontrollable, these events can not be disabled by the su-
pervisor. Not only the forbidden states must then be excluded in S, but also states
from which there are uncontrollable transitions to forbidden states. The following
proposition shows how the supervisor is then obtained by generating an extended set
of forbidden states X̂ef . It is a minor modification and special case of the supervisor
synthesis method presented in Malik and Flordal (2008).
Proposition 5 (Observer Based Supervisor) Consider a transition system G and
corresponding observerO(G) with state space X̂ , uncontrollable event set Σu, tran-
sition function δ̂, and forbidden state set X̂f . The extended forbidden state set
X̂ef = {Y ∈ X̂ | (∃su ∈ Σ
∗
u) δ̂(Y, su) ∈ X̂f}
results in the maximally permissive and controllable supervisor S = O(G)\X̂e
f
for the closed loop system O(G)‖S = S.
Proof (sketch): Since the supervisor S = O(G)\X̂e
f
is a subautomaton of O(G)
and both are deterministic, it follows that the supervisor is a model of the closed loop
system, i.e. O(G) ‖ S = S. In the supervisor, only those states are removed from
which it is possible to reach a forbidden state by only executing uncontrollable tran-
sitions. Thus, the supervisor S is maximally permissive. Furthermore, all border tran-
sitions entering X̂ef are controllable, and since these transitions are removed from S,
only controllable events are disabled. Hence, the supervisor is controllable. ✷
Example 12 Consider the transition system G and its observerO(G) in Fig. 17. The
secret states are XS = {2, 5} and the uncontrollable event Σu = {d} (denoted by
exclamation mark). Both CSO and CSA result in the forbidden (non-safe) state set
X̂f = {{2}, {5}}. Since the event d is uncontrollable, the set of extended forbidden
G
0 1 2
3 4 5
a
a ε
c
ε !d
b
O(G)
{0,1,2} {2}
{N}
{3,4} {5}
{N}
a
b
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Fig. 17 Transition system G in Example 12 and its observer O(G).
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states in the observer X̂ef = {{2}, {3, 4}, {5}}. Thus, the only remaining state in the
supervisor S = O(G)\X̂e
f
is X̂ \X̂ef = {{0, 1, 2}}, and the disabled events in this
block state are b and c, while the event a is enabled. ✷
8.2 Incremental supervisor generation by nonblocking preserving abstraction
In Section 4.3 it was shown how a forbidden state verification problem can be trans-
formed to a nonblocking problem.More specifically, an observerO(G) has forbidden
states if and only if the extended observer Oe(G) in (6) has blocking states. To for-
mulate this as a supervisor synthesis problem, the added w self-loops in the local
observers at the forbidden states are considered to be uncontrollable. This means that
the transitions to the blocking states in the extended observer are uncontrollable. The
source states at these uncontrollable transitions (the originally forbidden states), as
well as the blocking states, will then be excluded in the nonblocking synthesis.
Since the extended observer Oe(G) is modular, consisting of synchronized local
extended observers, the same type of abstraction as in Section 4.3 can be applied also
before the nonblocking and controllable supervisor is computed. Instead of conflict
equivalence that preserves nonblocking properties for verification purpose, a some-
what finer equivalence is required to be able to make synthesis on the abstracted
observer. In (Flordal and Malik, 2009; Mohajerani et al., 2014, 2017), a supervisor
synthesis equivalence is proposed by which an incremental abstraction is performed
similar to Algorithm 1 in Section 4.2. This compositional synthesis, which is also
implemented in the DES software tool Supremica (Åkesson et al., 2006), is applied
to the modular extended observer Oe(G) in (6), including the uncontrollable events
mentioned above.
Example 13 Consider again the 2-story building with two elevators and the floor ob-
servers depicted in Fig. 15. The set of secret states for the floors are XF
1
S = {3}
and XF
2
S = {1, 2
′}. As can be seen in Fig. 15, the floor observers have no state
exclusively including 3 , while there is a state in the second floor observer that exclu-
sively includes state 2′. This state is a CSO non-safe state, which makes the second
floor non-opaque. To make the whole system opaque, a supervisor S is generated
that restricts the second floor observer from entering the non-safe state. The resulting
supervisor is shown in Fig. 18, where the synchronous composition O(F 2)‖S does
not include the non-safe state 2′.
Table 4 shows |X̂ |, |T̂ | and the elapsed time (tSe ) for generating both composi-
tional and monolithic supervisors, for the non-opaque building examples explained
in Section 7. The model has the same structure with similar set of secret states XS
on each floor. The resulting computation times for the larger examples are about 3-6
times faster using the incremental synthesis procedure. ✷
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Fig. 18 Supervisor S for the whole system, and the observer of the second floor O(F 2) after synchro-
nization with the supervisor.
9 Conclusions
To tackle the exponential observer generation complexity for current-state opacity/
anonymity verification and enforcement, but also the complexity that arises when
modular subsystems are synchronized, an incremental local observer abstraction is
proposed. The two notions of current-state opacity and current-state anonymity are
formulated based on state labels in transition systems that are naturally extended to
modular systems. Non-safe states in corresponding local observers are then consid-
ered as forbidden states. By introducing simple detector automata, this problem is
easily transformed to a nonblocking problem for which efficient existing abstrac-
tion methods are applied. This transformation to a nonblocking problem by detector
automata is a generic technique with a great potential. A recent alternative exam-
ple is incremental abstraction for verification of diagnosability (Noori-Hosseini and
Lennartson, 2019).
Table 4 Number of states and transitions of supervisors based on incremental and monolithic synthesis
for non-opaque buildings with n floors andm elevators. The larger examples obtain modular supervisors
based on incremental synthesis.
F i/Ej-model S incremental synth. S monolithic synth.
(n,m) |X̂| |T̂ | tSe (s) |X̂| |T̂ | t
S
e (s)
(1,3) 1 0 0.02 1 0 0.02
(2,2) 2 5 0.05 2 5 0.13
(2,3) 3 10 0.09 3 6 0.31
(3,3) (3,7) (10,66) 70 61 700 441
(3,4) (3,6) (12,60) 54 – – –
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The main theoretical development in this paper is the combined incremental ab-
straction and observer generation for systems with shared unobservable events. Due
to the need for additional temporary state labels, the more general but less efficient
visible bisimulation is then used as abstraction. An interesting alternative is to intro-
duce arbitrary state labels in the more efficient abstractions that also have been used
in this paper, but then only applied to transition systems without shared unobservable
events. The efficiency of the proposed methods is demonstrated through a modular
multiple floor/elevator building example. Both verification and supervisor synthesis
to enforce a secure system are investigated. The results show a great improvement
when abstraction is included especially for verification, while there is hope for some
further improvements in the observer based supervisor synthesis.
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